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OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION 
 
The outline of this dissertation is going to present the applications that are the subject of the 
work and also the lay down of work content.  
Chapter 1 reviews the conventional PSA main concepts, summarizes a short introduction 
history of Dynamic PSA (DPSA) and presents a non-exhaustive DPSA state-of-the-art with the 
recent and future developments.  
Chapter 2 presents the first application of the thesis, which is actually an introduction in the 
context of the Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis (IDDA) code, that represents the main tool 
used in the attempt of approaching the Dynamic PSA. 
Starting from a description that reflects the level of knowledge about the system, IDDA code is 
able to develop all the scenarios of events compatible with the description received, from both 
points of view: either logical construction, or probabilistic coherence. By describing the system 
configuration and operation in a logically consistent manner, all the information is worked out by 
the code and is made available to the analyst as results in terms of system unavailability, 
minimal cut sets, uncertainty associated. The code allows also the association of different 
consequences that could be of interest for the analyst. The consequences could be of any type, 
such as economical, equipment outage time, etc.; for instance it can be considered an outage 
time for certain components of the system and then is calculated the “expected risk”. The 
association of consequences provides the inputs for a good decision making process. 
Chapter 3 represents the core applications of the present work. The applications purpose is the 
coupling between the logic probabilistics of the system or plant and associated phenomenology 
of primary heat transport system of a generic CANDU 6 NPP. 
First application is the coupling between the logic-probabilistic model of EWS system and 
associated phenomenology of primary heat transport system of CANDU 6 NPP. The considered 
plant transient is the total Loss of Main Feed-water with or without the coincident failure of the 
Emergency Water Supply System.  
The second application is considering the CANDU 6 Station Blackout as plant transient-
consequential condition, moreover the loss of all AC power sources existing on the site. The 
transient scenarios development consider the possibility to recover the offsite grid and the use 
of mobile diesel generators in order to mitigate the accident consequences. The  purpose is to 
challenge the plant design and response and to check if the plant conditions of a severe 
accident are reached. The plant response is challenged for short and long periods of time. 
The IDDA code allows interfacing the logic-probabilistic model of the system with the plant 
response in time, therefore with the evolution in time of the plant process variables. This allows 
raising sequences of possible events related in cause-consequence reasoning, each one giving 
place to a scenario with its development and its consequences. Therefore this allows acquiring 
the knowledge not only of which sequences of events are taking place, but also of the real 
environment in which they are taking place. 
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Associating the system sequences that lead to system unavailability on demand with the 
resulting phenomenology proves to be a useful tool for the decision making process, both in the 
design phase and for the entire power plant life time. 
Chapter 4 presents future possible applications that could be developed with the present 
Dynamic PSA approach. A particular application could be the optimization or development of 
robust plant emergency operating procedures. In fact it consists in the coupling between the 
logic-probabilistics of the plant configurations corresponding to the Emergency Operating 
Procedure (EOP) and the associated phenomenology of the primary heat transport systems 
with the consideration for the plant safety systems.  
The application could highlight those situations where the plant fails either because of hardware 
failures or system dynamics and furthermore to reveal  those situations where changing of the 
hardware states brings the process variables of the system state out of the system domain. 
A timeline course should be created for the process variables characterizing the plant state and 
that should reveal the time windows that operators have at disposition for intervention, in order 
to avoid potentially catastrophic conditions. Some week points in the EOP could be identified 
and then resolutions to be provided for their improvement, on the basis of sensitivity analyses.  
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and the insights of the work and outlines possible 
improvements in terms of the present methodology proposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Table of Contents 
OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION ..................................................................................................................... 1 
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................................... 6 
List of acronyms ...................................................................................................................................... 7 
List of tables ............................................................................................................................................ 9 
List of figures ........................................................................................................................................... 9 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 12 
CHAPTER 1 ............................................................................................................................................ 14 
1.1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment.............................................................................................. 14 
1.2 Dynamic PSA – a state of the art............................................................................................. 16 
1.2.1 Monte Carlo (MC) Simulation ................................................................................................ 17 
1.2.2 Discrete Dynamic Event Tree (DDET) ..................................................................................... 18 
1.2.3 GO method ........................................................................................................................... 19 
1.2.4 Digraph/Fault Graph ............................................................................................................. 19 
1.2.5 Markov Modeling .................................................................................................................. 20 
1.2.6 Combined methods ............................................................................................................... 20 
1.2.7 Summary............................................................................................................................... 22 
1.3 Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis (IDDA) ......................................................................... 22 
1.4 References ............................................................................................................................. 24 
CHAPTER 2 ............................................................................................................................................ 27 
2.1 Introduction of CANDU 6 design .................................................................................................. 27 
2.2 Emergency Water System (EWS) description ................................................................................ 30 
2.2.1 Emergency water supply to Steam Generators ...................................................................... 31 
2.2.2 Emergency water supply to the primary heat transport system ............................................. 32 
2.2.3 Emergency water supply to ECCS heat exchangers ................................................................ 32 
2.3 EWS system unavailability analysis ............................................................................................... 32 
2.3.1 IDDA input file syntax ............................................................................................................ 33 
2.3.2 Study Assumptions for System Unavailability ........................................................................ 35 
2.3.3 EWS – Generation of the universe ......................................................................................... 35 
2.4. EWS - “RISK“ Analysis .................................................................................................................. 40 
2.4.1 Complementary cumulative density function (CCDF) ............................................................. 43 
2.5. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 50 
4 
 
2.6. References .................................................................................................................................. 51 
CHAPTER 3 ............................................................................................................................................ 52 
3. 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 52 
3.2 CANDU 6 Design - Safety philosophy ............................................................................................ 52 
3.3 CANDU 6 NPP – Total Loss of Main Feedwater (TLOMFW) transient ............................................. 53 
3.3.1 Total Loss of Main Feedwater (TLOMFW) transient description ............................................. 53 
3.3.2 Thermal-hydraulic model assumptions .................................................................................. 55 
3.3.3 RELAP 5 – CANDU 6 thermal-hydraulic model description ..................................................... 56 
3.3.4 IDDA Input – Logic-probabilistics model ................................................................................ 64 
3.4 DYNAMIC PSA procedure description ........................................................................................... 66 
3.4.1. DYNAMIC PSA approach results ............................................................................................ 68 
3.4.2. Thermal-hydraulic results of the simulated transients scenarios ........................................... 70 
3.4.3.FORTRAN programming code interface ................................................................................. 71 
3.4.4. DYNAMIC PSA approach results ............................................................................................ 72 
3.5 Generic CANDU 6 plant response to  a  Station Blackout (SBO) accident ....................................... 75 
3.5.1 SBO Accident description ...................................................................................................... 75 
3.5.2 SBO study assumptions ......................................................................................................... 76 
3.5.3. IDDA logic-probabilistics model ............................................................................................ 78 
3.5.4. SBO transient thermal-hydraulic results ............................................................................... 80 
3.6 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................. 89 
3.7 References ................................................................................................................................... 91 
CHAPTER 4 ............................................................................................................................................ 92 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 92 
4.2 The approach description ............................................................................................................ 92 
4.2.1 The Emergency Operating Procedure scenarios delineation .................................................. 93 
4.2.2 Critical plant safety parameters ............................................................................................. 94 
4.3 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................. 95 
4.4 References ................................................................................................................................... 96 
CHAPTER 5 ............................................................................................................................................ 97 
ANNEX A ............................................................................................................................................. 100 
ANNEX B .............................................................................................................................................. 104 
ANNEX C .............................................................................................................................................. 117 
5 
 
ANNEX D ............................................................................................................................................. 118 
ANNEX E .............................................................................................................................................. 120 
ANNEX F .............................................................................................................................................. 121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Acknowledgments  
 
 
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my principal advisor Prof. 
Marino Mazzini for the continuous support of my Ph.D study, for his patience and immense 
knowledge. His guidance and understanding helped me in all the time of research and writing of 
this thesis.  
 
I would like to show my gratitude to Dr.Ing. Davide Mazzini who gave me the necessary support 
to pass over the critical moments in the development of the work. Thanks to his very nice and 
valuable friendship my stay and my research experience in Pisa was full of pleasant moments.  
 
It is a pleasure to thank those who made this thesis possible and I am very grateful to Eng. 
Remo Galvagni and Dr.Ing. Mariagrazia Semenza. Due to their help my understanding for the 
use of IDDA code was possible.  
 
I would like to thank and to show my gratitude to my family: my parents Constantin and Ioana 
for guiding me throughout life and helping me to choose the path toward a successful nuclear 
engineering career, encouraging me to carry on a project such as doctoral studies, and to my 
wife Narcisa for her continuous understanding and support to pursue and bring this work to the 
end. 
 
Last but not the least, I offer my regards to all of those who supported me in any respect during 
the completion of this work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
List of acronyms  
 
AC - Alternative Current 
ADS - Accident Dynamic Simulator 
ASDV - Atmospheric Steam Discharge Valve 
BPC - Boiler Pressure Control 
CANDU - Canadian Deuterium Uranium 
CCDF - Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function  
CCF - Common Cause Failure 
CDF - Cumulative Distribution Function 
CSDV - Condenser Steam Discharge Valve 
CSN - Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear 
D2O -Heavy Water 
DC - Degasser Condenser 
DDET - Dynamic Decision Event Tree 
DETAM - Dynamic Event Tree Analysis Method 
DPSA - Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
DYLAM - Dynamic Event Logic Analytical Methodology 
ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System 
EOP - Emergency Operating Procedure 
EPS - Emergency Power Supply 
ET - Event Tree 
ETA -Event Tree Analysis 
EWS - Emergency Water System 
FT - Fault Tree 
FORTRAN - Formula Translation 
GRS - Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit 
8 
 
HTS - Heat Transport System 
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency 
IDA - Integrated Decision Analysis 
IDDA - Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis 
IE - Initiating Event 
ISA - Integrated Safety Approach 
KTH - Royal Institute of Technology 
LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident 
MCS - Minimal Cut Sets 
MC - Monte Carlo 
MCDET - Monte Carlo Dynamic Event Tree 
MCR – Main Control Room 
MDG – Mobile Diesel Generator 
MSSV - Main Steam Discharge Valve 
MTTR – Mean Time To Repair 
NPP - Nuclear Power Plant 
PSA - Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
PHTS – Primary Heat Transport System 
PHWR – Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor 
RCW - Recirculated Cooling Water 
RPV - Rector Pressure Vessel 
SBO - Station Blackout 
SDE - Site Design Earthquake 
SDCS - Shutdown Cooling System 
SDG - Stand-by Diesel Generators 
SDS - Safety Shutdown System 
9 
 
SG - Steam Generator 
TLOMFW - Total Loss of Main Feedwater 
UO2 - Uranium dioxide 
VTT - Vattenfall Nuclear Power 
 
List of tables 
 
Table 2.1 Grouping of CANDU 6 Special safety systems 
Table 2.2 Application of IDDA code to the evaluation of EWS unavailability 
Table 2.3 Results of the application of IDDA code to the evaluation of EWS unavailability  
Table 2.4 Input data considered for unavailability and risk analyses 
Table 3.1 Plant response associated to the TLOMFW transient 
Table 3.2 Main input data used for the thermal-hydraulic model 
Table 3.3 Thermal balance comparison 
Table 3.4 System pressure losses comparison 
Table 3.5 Top events unavailability for short and long term emergency water supply 
Table 3.6 SBO scenarios with unique consequences or similar consequences 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1.1 Example of a Discrete Dynamic Event Tree 
Figure 2.1 Simplified CANDU 6 plant layout 
Figure 2.2 The simplified scheme of the EWS system 
Figure 2.3 Binary entropy function 
Figure 2.4 Unavailability of the two EWS system configurations 
Figure 2.5 Complementary cumulative distribution function 
Figure 2.6 CCDF resulted for the first EWS system configuration 
Figure 2.7 CCDFs comparison for the both EWS system configurations 
10 
 
Figure 2.8 Significant risk contributors for EWS Configuration 1 
Figure 2.9 IDDA output – percentual risk contribution for the failure of the first two significant 
basic events of EWS configuration 1 
Figure 2.10 Significant risk contributors for EWS Configuration 2 
Figure 2.11 IDDA output - percentual risk contribution for the failure of the first two significant 
basic events. 
Figure 3.1 CANDU 6 Primary Heat transport system and pressure inventory control system 
Figure 3.2 Main feedwater flowrate 
Figure 3.3 SG steam flowrate 
Figure 3.4 Steam Generator steam title 
Figure 3.5 Power of one equivalent fuel channel 
Figure 3.6 Most contributing scenario for the system unavailability 
Figure 3.7 The dynamic PSA coupling procedure 
Figure 3.8 Example of results generated by the dynamic PSA methodology 
Figure 3.9 The main scenarios analyzed within the RELAP5 thermal-hydraulic model 
Figure 3.10 Scenarios 1 to 8, SG Downcomer Level 
Figure 3.11 Scenarios 1 to 8, PHTS temperature 
Figure 3.12 Trend Curve and Polynomial Fit 
Figure 3.13 Trend Curves of SG Downcomer Level 
Figure 3.14 Trend curves of PHTS Coolant Temperature 
Figure 3.15 SBO Even Tree resulted 
Figure 3.16 SBO Event Tree - Scenario 2  
Figure 3.17 SBO Event Tree - Scenario 3 
Figure 3.18 SBO Event Tree – Scenario 4 
Figure 3.19 SBO Event Tree – Scenario 6 
Figure 3.20 AFW (EWS) flowrate – Operator actuates MSSVs 
Figure 3.21 SG downcomer level – Operator actuates MSSVs 
11 
 
Figure 3.22 Fuel sheath temperature – Operator actuates MSSVs 
Figure 3.23 PHTS coolant (D20) temperature – Operator actuates MSSVs 
Figure 3.24 SBO Event Tree – Scenario 18 
Figure 3.25 SBO Event Tree – Scenario 19 
Figure 3.26 SBO Event Tree – Scenario 20 
Figure 3.27 SBO Event Tree – Scenario 22 
Figure 3.28 AFW (EWS) flowrate – MSSVs are cycling 
Figure 3.29 SG downcomer level – MSSVs are cycling 
Figure 3.30 Fuel sheath temperature– MSSVs are cycling 
Figure 3.31 PHTS coolant (D2O) temperature – MSSVs are cycling 
Figure 4.1 Dynamic PSA approach simple sketch 
Figure 4.2 Critical safety parameter vs. plant scenario space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Nuclear safety focuses the unintended conditions or events that could lead to radiological 
releases from authorized activities. It relates mainly to intrinsic problems or hazards. 
Nuclear safety deploys nuclear safety analyses which are an essential element to the safety 
assessment of a nuclear power plant.  
Safety assessment is the systematic process that is carried out throughout the design process 
to ensure that all relevant safety requirements are met by the proposed or actual design of the 
plant. Safety assessment includes, but is not limited to, the formal safety analysis. 
Safety analysis involves deterministic and probabilistic analyses in support of the sitting, design, 
commissioning, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear power plant. Safety analyses 
demonstrate that the overall plant design is capable of meeting the prescribed and acceptable 
limits for radiation doses and releases for each plant condition category and that the defense –in 
– depth is achieved. 
Deterministic analysis aims to demonstrate that a nuclear facility is tolerant to identified 
faults/hazards that are within the "design basis", thereby defining the limits of safe operation. 
Probabilistic analysis aims to provide a realistic estimate of the risk presented by the nuclear 
facility. This can also be used to confirm the validity of the deterministic safety assessment.  
These two types of analysis can complement one another to provide additional insights to the 
hazard or risk problem.  
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) has been applied to large complex systems for more 
than thirty years. Many nuclear power plant (NPP) operators have performed probabilistic safety 
assessments to identify and understand key plant vulnerabilities. As a result of the availability of 
these PSA studies, there is a desire to use them to enhance plant safety and to operate the 
plants in the most efficient manner practicable.  
PSA is an effective tool for this purpose as it assists plant management to target resources 
where the largest benefit for plant safety can be obtained. However, any PSA which is to be 
used to support decision making at NPPs must have a credible and defensible basis [1]. 
The PSA methods have also been used in other industry sectors and military applications. The 
first full scale application of PSA methods was the Reactor Safety Study WASH-14001. 
                                                             
1 WASH-1400, 'The Reactor Safety Study', is a report produced in 1975 for the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission by a committee of specialists under supervision of Professor Norman 
Rasmussen from MIT. The report is considered nowadays obsolete. 
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The PSA applications are numerous, and spans from plant design phase throughout entire plant 
operational lifetime, including the area of incident and accident mitigation and management. 
The well-established PSA techniques integrate various reliability modeling tools, such as fault 
trees and event trees that numerically quantify the probability of accident occurrences.  
The PSA methods typically rely on the risk analyst to identify the risk scenarios. With the growth 
of the size of the dynamic systems and the complexity of the interactions between hardware, 
software and humans, it is extremely difficult to enumerate the risky scenarios by the traditional 
ET/FT methods [2]. 
It is already commonly agreed by the international PSA practitioners that conventional 
standalone Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) has a number of fundamental limitations. 
Specifically, PSA can help to quantify probability of what is known as a safety issue, but it is not 
capable in revealing unknown issues. During abnormal transients and accidents, the complexity 
of nuclear power plant may drive the system non-linearly with respect to the safety parameters.  
Therefore it appeared as a necessity to evolve from the conventional PSA  toward an integrated 
approach, that considers in one platform the deterministic - probabilistic approaches. In this way 
one can perform comprehensive safety analyses which can tackle the complexity of the power 
plants. The integrated approach is called also Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Assessment. 
The present work is an attempt to approach the Dynamic PSA (DPSA) throughout a coupled 
use of the Boolean logic integrated by the IDDA code and thermal-hydraulic analysis supported 
by the RELAP 5 code. The work attempts approaching Dynamic PSA throughout three different 
applications within the general CANDU 6 NPP operational context, without making reference to 
any particular CANDU 6 NPP that is operated by the CANDU owners’ group countries. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) provides a tool for systematic and logical modeling of 
accident progression, is a comprehensive, structured approach for identifying failure scenarios; 
it constitutes a conceptual and mathematical tool for deriving numerical estimates of risk, 
including uncertainties estimation. 
PSA methodology integrates information about plant design, operating practices, operating 
histories, component reliabilities, human behavior, thermal hydraulic plant response, accident 
phenomena, and brings to its conclusion at the evaluation of potential environmental and health 
effects. 
The analysis (i.e. PSA), is done using a logical and systematic approach that makes use of 
realistic assessments of the performance of the equipment and plant personnel as a basis for 
the calculations. This in principle has the potential to produce an understanding of the inherent 
risk of operating the plant over a much wider range of conditions than the traditional 
deterministic methods, which generally define what is assumed to be a bounding set of fault 
conditions, [3]. 
The classical PSA approach deploys the event tree/fault tree methods. An event tree analysis 
(ETA) is an inductive procedure that shows all possible outcomes resulting from an accidental 
(initiating) event, taking into account whether installed safety barriers and systems are 
functioning or not, and additional events and factors. By studying all relevant accidental events 
the ETA can be used to identify all potential accident scenarios and sequences in a complex 
system. Design and procedural weaknesses can be identified, and probabilities of the various 
outcomes from an accidental event can be determined [4]. 
The fault tree itself is a graphic model of the various parallel and sequential combinations of 
faults that will result in the occurrence of the predefined undesired event. The faults can be 
events that are associated with component hardware failures, human errors, software errors, or 
any other pertinent events which can lead to the undesired event. A fault tree thus depicts the 
logical interrelationships of basic events that lead to the undesired event, the top event of the 
fault tree [5]. 
Fault tree analysis techniques were first developed in the early 1960's. Since this time they have 
been readily adopted by a wide range of engineering disciplines as one of the primary methods 
of performing reliability and safety analysis. 
The relative size (i.e., complexity) of the event trees and fault trees is largely a matter of 
preference of the PSA analysts and also depends on the features of the software used. The 
most used PSA approaches employed are named Large Event Tree-Small Fault Tree and 
respectively Small Event Tree-Large Fault Tree. 
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In international practice, three levels of PSA are generally recognized: 
 Level 1 PSA: the design and operation of the plant are analyzed in order to identify the 
sequences of events that can lead to core damage and the core damage frequency is 
estimated. Level 1 PSA provides insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the 
safety related systems and procedures in place or envisaged as preventing core 
damage. The detailed methodology of Level 1 PSA is presented in references [6] and 
[7]. 
 
 Level 2 PSA: the chronological progression of core damage sequences identified in 
Level 1 PSA is evaluated, including a quantitative assessment of phenomena arising 
from severe damage to reactor fuel. Level 2 PSA identifies ways in which associated 
releases of radioactive material from fuel can result in releases to the environment. It 
also estimates the frequency, magnitude and other relevant characteristics of the 
release of radioactive material to the environment. This analysis provides additional 
insights into the relative importance of accident prevention and mitigation measures and 
the physical barriers to the release of radioactive material to the environment (e.g. a 
containment building and associated Engineering Safety Features). The detailed 
methodology of Level 2 PSA in presented in IAEA guideline, reference [8].  
 
 In Level 3 PSA, public health and other societal consequences are estimated, such as 
the contamination of land or food from the accident sequences that lead to a release of 
radioactivity to the environment. The detailed methodology of Level 3 PSA in presented 
in IAEA guideline, reference [9].  
 
Level 1 PSA, Level 2 PSA and Level 3 PSA are sequential analyses, where the results of each 
assessment usually serve as a basis for the PSA at the next level. 
Level 1 PSAs have now been carried out for most nuclear power plants worldwide. In recent 
years, a trend has emerged for Level 2 PSAs or limited Level 2 PSAs (e.g. Level 2 PSAs in 
which the large early release frequency is estimated) to be carried out for many types of nuclear 
power plant. In addition, Level 3 PSAs have been carried out in several States, [6]. 
The PSA applications cover a broad field of uses, either for design or in connection with the 
NPP operation, either for a regulatory perspective. The use of PSA concerns the most the NPP 
design and operation, but applications are done also in support of regulatory bodies, in order to 
ensure a risk informed decision making.   
The PSA applications in connection with the plant design and operation are the following: 
 Use of PSA to support NPP  design 
 Use of PSA to support NPP upgrade and back fitting activities and plant modifications 
 Use of PSA in NPP maintenance 
 Use of PSA in connection with NPP technical specifications  
 Risk based configuration control 
16 
 
 Risk based safety indicators 
 PSA based evaluation and rating of operational events 
 Use of PSA to evaluate safety issues 
 Use of PSA to support NPP periodic safety review 
 Use of PSA to improve emergency operating procedures (EOPs) 
 Use of PSA to support NPP accident management 
 Use of PSA to support NPP emergency planning 
 Use of PSA to improve operator training programs. 
 
For a better understanding of PSA applications, it is recommended the technical document of 
IAEA, reference [1]. 
1.2 Dynamic PSA – a state of the art 
 
PSA methodology has been successfully applied in different projects, but it has been 
recognized that it is hard to characterize some complex dynamical systems by solely applying 
such techniques as Event Tree/ Fault Tree analysis. Event trees or fault trees are 
implementations of logic. Primarily, the Boolean logic-based models are limited in terms of their 
capability to specify the timing of events or even the order in which events occur. It is also 
difficult to model the dependency of the probability or rate of occurrence of events on scenarios 
or time. 
 
The classical combinatorial fault tree does not capture the potentially critical significance of the 
temporal ordering of failure events in a system and neither the relevant process variables with 
reference to the failure sequence identified (i.e. MCS). 
Acknowledging such difficulties, a set of new methodologies were developed under the name of 
“Dynamic reliability” or “Dynamic PSA”. Because of the diverse background of people working 
on this problem, it is sometimes hard to define the term “dynamic reliability”. 
Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that the following points list the basic characteristics of 
dynamic reliability/PSA modeling:  
 
 The dynamic phenomena have a strong influence on the system’s response (e.g. the 
operation of control/protection devices upon reaching assigned thresholds of the process 
variables values); 
 The hardware components failure behavior and the human operator actions depend on 
the process dynamics; 
 The complex interactions between human operator actions and hardware components 
influence the system’s response and failure behavior; 
 There are a variety of degraded modes related to multiple failure modes and to the 
process dynamics. 
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The analysis performed by Reina and Amendola in the end of 80ies, see [10], explored at that 
time the possibility of global treatment of the dynamic PSA. Then few years later the DYLAM 
and ADS implementations were applied to treat DPSA problems in nuclear power plants and 
other areas, see references [11], [12] and [13]. 
 
During that time beginning of 90ies, a more general mathematical framework was introduced for 
probabilistic dynamics that has been interpreted as equivalent to neutron transport theory and it 
was proposed to be solved by Monte Carlo simulation, see references [14], [15]. But, however 
the mathematical formulation for the dynamic PSA problem was first time attempted by Smidts 
C. and Devooght J, see [16] and then expanded by Izquierdo and Labeau, see references [16], 
[17] and [18]. 
 
The wide acceptance of traditional ET/FT methods has led some authors to propose extension 
to include some dynamic features in the FT framework. Others have introduced different 
graphical tools to capture the dynamical features, some of which have been used in 
applications. Examples are Petri Nets, Dynamic Flow-graphs, and Event Sequence Diagrams 
[2]. A detailed discussion of these techniques can be found in the following sub-chapters. 
However for a broader overview of the dynamic PSA methodology, there are few several review 
papers of the DPSA, such as references [19] and [20]  
 
Dynamic reliability methods are powerful mathematical frameworks capable of handling 
interactions among components and process variables explicitly. In principle, they constitute a 
more realistic modeling of systems for the purposes of reliability, risk and safety analyses. 
Although there is a growing recognition in the risk specialists community of the potentially 
greater correctness of these methods, no serious effort has been undertaken to utilize them in 
industrial applications [21]. 
 
Several dynamic approaches to reliability problems have been propounded during the last 
decade. They all turn out to be different numerical treatments with different assumptions of a 
unified theory called probabilistic dynamics. The two main candidate techniques for solving 
large problems are the Monte Carlo (MC) and Dynamic Discrete Event Tree (DDET) methods. 
Each of them has specific advantages and drawbacks, mainly related to the required memory 
and computation time [22]. 
 
1.2.1 Monte Carlo (MC) Simulation 
 
While DDETs require the events to occur at predefined discrete time only, the Monte Carlo 
simulation approaches allow events to happen at any time. This avoids the combinational 
explosion of DDETs. Monte Carlo methods are insensitive to the complexity and dimension of 
the system. Any modeling assumption could be included, the non-fixed failure rate assumption, 
random delays, interaction between components and process dynamics, etc.  
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Generally the MC methods estimate the system safety or reliability directly, expressed in form of 
a probabilistic distribution function and the behavior of systems is governed by an underlying 
transport equation. The state explosion makes the analytical solution of the transport equation 
prohibitively difficult and the Monte Carlo simulation is seen as almost the only feasible solution, 
see reference [15]. 
The quantity that is of interest is defined as being the expected value of a random variable 
associated to the process, an estimator is obtained for each selected situation and then is 
averaged on the whole sample. As a Monte Carlo estimate relies on the expected value, the 
effect of uncertain parameters can be directly assessed during the simulation; this actually 
enlarges the number of variables on which the average is performed. 
However, only Monte Carlo treatments for industrial applications within dynamic reliability 
domain are still expected to come, so far.  
1.2.2 Discrete Dynamic Event Tree (DDET) 
 
Discrete Dynamic Event Trees (DDETs) are simulation methods implemented by forward 
branching event trees, the branch points are restricted at discrete times only. The knowledge of 
the physical system under study is contained in a numerical simulation, written by the analyst. 
The components of the system are modeled in terms of discrete states, see references [23] and 
[24] All possible branches of the system evolution are tracked systematically.  
 
One restriction of DDET is that the events (branches) only happen at predefined discrete time 
intervals. It is assumed that if the appropriate time step is chosen, DDETs would investigate all 
possible scenarios. It is a straightforward extension of the classical event trees. The binary logic 
restriction of the classical event trees is removed. 
 
An example of a DDET is given in Figure 1.1, below: 
 
Figure 1.1 Example of a Discrete Dynamic Event Tree 
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The systematic branching would easily lead to such a huge number of sequences that the 
management of the output Event Tree becomes awkward. Measures have been taken to 
eliminate the explosion of branches. It can be done by increasing the length of the time step, but 
this may be at the expense of the accuracy of the analysis. 
A cut-off probability was introduced in some implementations. The branches with a probability 
lower than cut-off would be discarded. Amendola in reference [25] suggested that when the 
number of failures in a sequence exceeds a user-defined value, further evolution along this 
sequence would be stopped 
Implementations of DDETs include methodologies such as DYLAM, see [26], [27] and ADS in 
reference [28] and ADS-IDA in reference [29].  
 
1.2.3 GO method 
 
The GO method [30, 31] is a success-oriented system analysis that uses seventeen operators 
to aid in model construction. It was developed by Kaman Sciences Corporation during the 
1960s for reliability analysis of electronics for the Department of Defense in U.S. 
The GO model can be constructed from engineering drawings by replacing system elements 
with one or more GO operators. Such operators are of three basic types: (1) independent, (2) 
dependent, and (3) logic. Independent operators are used to model components requiring no 
input; the dependent operators require at least one input in order to have an output. Logic 
operators, on the other hand, combine the various operators into the success logic of the 
system being modeled. With the probability data for each independent and dependent operator, 
the probability of successful operation can then be calculated. 
The GO method is used in practical application where the boundary conditions for the system to 
be modeled are well defined by a system schematic or other design documents. However, the 
failure modes are implicitly modeled, making it unsuitable for detailed analysis of failure modes 
beyond the level of component events shown in the system drawing. Furthermore, it does not 
treat common cause failures, nor provide structural information (i.e. the minimum cut sets) 
regarding the system. A brief description of GO flow, which is based on GO method, is 
documented in literature , see reference  [30]. 
1.2.4 Digraph/Fault Graph 
 
The fault graph method/digraph matrix analysis [30, 31] uses the mathematics and language of 
graph theory such as “path set” (i.e. a set of models traveled on a path) and “reach-ability” (i.e. 
the complete set of all possible paths between any two nodes), according to reference [31]. 
This method is similar to a GO chart but uses AND and OR gates instead. The connectivity 
matrix, derived from adjacency matrix for the system, shows whether a fault node will lead to the 
top event. These matrices are then computer analyzed to give singletons (single components 
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that can cause system failure) or doubletons (pairs of components that can cause system 
failure).  Digraph method allows cycles and feedback loops which make it attractive for dynamic 
system. 
1.2.5 Markov Modeling 
 
Markov modeling [31] is a classical modeling technique used for assessing the time-dependent 
behavior of many dynamic systems [30]. In a ‘Markov chain’ processes, transitions between 
states are assumed to occur only at discrete points in time. On the other hand, in a ‘discrete 
Markov process’, transitions between states are allowed to occur at any point in time. For 
process system, the discrete system states can be defined in terms of ranges of process 
variables as well as component status. 
This methodology also incorporates time explicitly, and can be extended to cover situations 
where problem parameters are time independent. The state probabilities of the system P(t) in a 
continuous Markov system analysis are obtained by the solution of a coupled set of first order, 
constant coefficient differential equations :  
                        dP/dt = M.P(t)  
where M is the matrix of coefficients whose off-diagonal elements are the transition rate and 
whose diagonal elements are such that the matrix columns sum to zero. An application of 
Markov modeling to a hold-up tank problem is discussed in literature [30], while Pate-Cornell 
used the technique to study the fire propagation for a subsystem on board a off-shore platform 
in [32]. 
1.2.6 Combined methods 
 
In the following the two most important developments in the field of dynamic PSA will be 
presented; mainly, there are two centers were the research has been carried progressively to 
bring the most to the industrial applications. However, so far there are not any industrial 
applications of the dynamic PSA, only isolated applications that proved to be beneficial to the 
problem understanding and for decision making. 
Probably, the most advanced application of the dynamic PSA methodologies has been 
developed by the nuclear safety authority of Spain – CSN. The research has been started in the 
1980’s and has involved few other institutions, such as universities and engineering companies. 
The methodology is called Integrated Safety Approach (ISA) and is a systematic verification 
approach which can be considered as an extension of PSA and accident analysis techniques, 
supported by a simulation system.  
The classical PSA static event trees are replaced by a generalized dynamic event-tree concept 
based on the theory of probabilistic dynamics (DDETs), see references [33] and [34]. Both 
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components of the risk, damage and likelihood are considered in this approach in a balanced 
and simultaneous way. 
The main steps of this methodology are: 
 Identification of damage variables and definition of risk acceptable regions in a 
frequency-damage plot. 
 Initiating event (IE) and initial state selection. 
 Modeling the deterministic characteristics of the plant (plant dynamics modeling) 
including crew procedures. 
 Modeling the stochastic characteristics of the plant (reliability modeling). 
 Event sequence generation. 
 Analysis of the results and verification of the risk requirements. 
Mainly the methodology has been employed in the delineation of the event trees, which were 
related to EOPs execution when combined with the complex plant dynamics involved and the 
large number of branches, see reference [35]. 
This software tool consists of a closed-loop plant/operator simulator: a thermal hydraulic code 
for simulating the plant transient (TRETA for PWR NPPs and TIZONA for BWR NPPs) and the 
procedures processor (COPMA III) to simulate the operator actions requested by the 
procedures, both coupled by a data communication system which allows the information 
exchange (SWBus). TRETA and TIZONA are modular simulation systems that are able to 
simulate virtually all the plant systems, including control, protection and balance of plant, and 
both include the necessary models to simulate PWR and BWR plants, according to reference 
[36].  
 
The thermal-hydraulic modules are based on elaborated models that combine a good 
representation of most of single and two phase water regimes with a relatively fast solution 
algorithm. The modules are capable to incorporate also other single-application oriented codes 
(i.e. RELAP5, MAAP, CONTAIN) as modules using parallel computing techniques , see 
reference [37]. 
 
Another advanced application has been developed by Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und 
Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) from Germany; this Institute coupled the Monte Carlo simulation and 
DDET, the coupled approach has been called MCDET. MCDET was realized as a set of 
software modules which were suitably connected with the integral accident analysis code 
MELCOR. The MCDET methodology was developed to consider time dependent interactions of 
stochastic events and the process dynamics. Within this application a sample of approximately 
9800 accident sequences were computed. To each accident sequence the respective set of 
events and the probability of occurrence are attached. Since these approach needs much 
computing resources, its application was restricted to the in-vessel phase of a station blackout 
(SBO) accident up to RPV failure, see reference [38].  
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Currently there is an ongoing joint program of VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland and 
Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) from Stockholm to develop an integrated platform of 
combined Dynamic Deterministic/Probabilistic Safety Assessment for performing 
comprehensive safety analysis which can tackle with multifaceted complexity of the power 
plants. The program is meant to develop a plan for collaborative activities between KTH and 
VTT for the period 2012-2014. 
1.2.7 Summary 
 
The Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Assessment (DPSA) methodology has been evolving in the 
last two decades. DPSA methodologies are capable of handling interactions between 
components and the process variables; they provide more realistic modeling of the dynamic 
systems for the purpose of risk analysis. There is a growing recognition in the risk community of 
the potentials of these methods. Discrete Dynamic Event Tree and Monte Carlo simulation are 
two classes of methods that have been widely used. 
The techniques discussed above address the deficiencies found in fault/event tree 
methodologies when analyzing dynamic scenarios. However, there are also limitations to their 
usage. The digraph and GO techniques model the system behavior and deal, in limited extends, 
with changes in model structure over time. On the other hand, Markov modeling requires the 
explicit identification of possible system states and the transitions between these states. This is 
a problem as it is difficult to envision the entire set of possible states prior to scenario 
development. DYLAM and DETAM can solve the problem through the use of implicit state-
transition definition. With the large tree-structure generated through the DYLAM and DETAM 
approaches, large computer resources are required. The second problem is that the implicit 
methodologies may require a considerable amount of analyst effort in data gathering and model 
construction. 
However, so far there are not any tools or methodologies to be used for industrial application 
purpose, the research and people involved in development of DPSA is still proposing and new 
attempts are ongoing. 
1.3 Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis (IDDA) 
 
Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis (IDDA) is a code developed by the Italian engineer Remo 
Galvagni in the 1980’s, and since that period has been continuously improved its features and 
capabilities. The developer has been the former Director of the Technical Commission for 
Licensing Operators of Research and Prototype Nuclear Plant within Italian National Committee 
for Nuclear Energy and also the former member of many IAEA working groups. 
 
IDDA code is  an enhanced decision-dynamic event tree. IDDA approach is based on a 
consistent application of Boolean logic and can be considered a methodology that allows the 
systematic and complete exploration of alternatives of plant states that are possible within the 
formulated assumptions. 
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Integrated Dynamic Decision Analysis provides a full representation of the plant states, as well 
as all the possible occurrences patterns, expressed in a set of mutually self-excluding 
sequences. Availability of the full set of alternatives allows the complete spectrum of possible 
probability-consequence conditions to be used as a basis for decisions in risk reduction. 
Furthermore it is possible to interface with the logic-probabilistic model a process simulator, in 
order to assess the status of each relevant process variable with reference to the failure 
sequence identified, allowing the mutual interactions of the hardware components and the 
physical evolution of the plant to be taken into account [39]. 
 
Starting from a description, reflecting the level of knowledge that the analyst has about the 
system, IDDA is able to develop all the sequences of events compatible with the description 
received, from the point of view both of the logical construction, as of the probabilistic 
coherence. The system description has the form a binary chart, where the real logical and 
chronological sequence of the events is described; the direction of each branch is characterized 
by a probability of occurrence that can be modified by the boundary conditions, and in particular 
by the same development of the events themselves (probabilities conditioned by the events 
dynamics). As a matter of fact, in dynamic cause-consequence logic, in addition to the direct 
logical interactions characterizing it, each event can influence the subsequent events, 
depending on deterministic cause-consequence relations or stochastic dependences. 
At the end of the analysis, the full set of the possible alternatives in which the system could 
evolve is obtained. These alternatives represent a “partition” since they are mutually exclusive; 
they are all and the sole possible alternatives, this allowing the method to guarantee the 
completeness and the coherence of the analysis. 
Employment of IDDA to generate alternatives and quantify their probabilities and consequences 
greatly eases the analyst’s task and also supplies him with tools and recordings that fully 
support his conclusions. Simplification of the logical-probabilistic model can reduce the set of 
alternatives to only few that further obviously facilitates investigation of the corrective measures 
best able to bring the plant into conformity with acceptable safety standards [40]. 
 
The methodology has been mainly deployed in chemical installations applications, but also in 
nuclear and thermal facilities. The following chapters will present the features and capabilities of 
the methodology. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2.1 Introduction of CANDU 6 design 
 
CANDU is an acronym for Canada Deuterium Uranium. A unique design, the CANDU system 
uses deuterium oxide (heavy water) as moderator and natural uranium as fuel. The core of the 
nuclear steam supply system of a CANDU 6 power plant is inside a large cylindrical vessel 
called the calandria. This vessel is filled with cool, low-pressure heavy water. The vessel houses 
380 horizontal tubes, loaded with natural uranium fuel bundles. 
The CANDU 6 plant layout can be seen below in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Simplified CANDU 6 plant layout 
Originally licensed in Canada, the CANDU 6 design has also been licensed in every country 
where it has been sold. The first of the CANDU 6 series entered commercial service in 1983. 
The initial design of CANDU 6 was derived as a single-unit version of the successful Pickering A 
station in Ontario - Canada, an integrated four-unit plant operated by Ontario Hydro.  Many  
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evolutionary improvements  have  been made in the  design  since these  first  units  entered  
service,  based  on improved  technology  and  the  feedback  of  operating  experience.  Also, 
many of these later improvements have been back-fitted to the older plants, [1]. 
Fuel channels are the primary high-technology element of the CANDU design.  A  closed loop 
containing  pressurized  heavy  water  transports  reactor  heat  to  conventional  U-tube  steam 
generators  and  then  to  the  steam  turbine. 
CANDU features such as natural uranium fuel and on power refuelling provides independence 
in fuel supply and respectively high capacity factors. 
All CANDU 6 power plants are highly automated, requiring only a minimum of manual operator 
action. Each plant has two independent digital computers which operate continuously, one 
operating and one on standby. All aspects of the plant's operation are monitored and controlled 
from the control room. In case that the main control room is not available, the station can be 
shut down and kept in a safe condition from a secondary control room in another part of the 
plant. 
CANDU 6 has four special safety systems: two independent fully capable and passively initiated 
shutdown systems (SDS1 and SDS2), the containment system, and the emergency core cooling 
system (ECCS). 
The two safety shutdown systems (Shutdown System No. 1 and Shutdown System No. 2) are 
physically and functionally separate from each other and from the reactor regulating system. 
Each of the two shutdown systems is independently capable of shutting down the reactor and 
maintaining the reactor shutdown for all design basis events. The relatively long prompt neutron 
generating time inherent in CANDU 6 reactors retards power excursions and reduces the speed 
required for shutdown system action, even for large hypothetical reactivity increases. 
The containment system, which includes the reactor building and the containment isolation 
system, provides a post-accident environmental barrier. 
The emergency core cooling system provides fuel cooling in the event that the normal reactor 
coolant (D2O) is lost from the heat transport system due to a loss of coolant accident. The 
reactor may not be operated without all of the special safety systems being available. 
Systems that provide reliable services, such as electrical power, cooling water, and air supplies 
to the special safety systems are referred to as safety support systems. To guard against cross-
linked and common mode events, all plant systems, including the safety system are assigned to 
one of two available Groups (Group 1 and Group 2). 
In case of accident conditions (e.g. LOCA), either Group can perform the necessary safety 
functions to maintain the plant in a safe state despite loss of the other Group. 
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Table 2.1 gives the list of systems that belong to each Group. 
Safety Function Group 1 Group 2 
Reactor shutdown Shutdown System 1 Shutdown System 2 
Fuel Cooling Emergency Core Cooling 
System 
Emergency Water System 
Emergency Power Supply 
Radioactivity Containment Reactor Building Air Coolers Containment system 
Plant Monitoring Main Control Room Secondary Control Area 
 
Table 2.1 Grouping of CANDU 6 Special safety systems 
The Special Safety Systems and standby safety related systems have been physically 
separated by their assignation into two groups (Group 1 and Group 2) in order to provide 
adequate protection against common cause failures from events such as: 
 Turbine disintegration and resultant missiles; 
 Fires that can lead to uninhabitable control centre, wide spread system damage, etc.; 
 Aircraft crash; 
 Failure of a common process e.g. Electrical Power Systems, Service Water System, 
etc.; 
 Common adverse environment e.g. extremes of temperature, pressure, humidity, 
radiation, toxic gases, etc. 
 
The CANDU safety philosophy is based on the concept of single/dual failures. “Single failure” is 
a failure of any process system which is required for the normal operation of the plant and “dual 
failure” represents a combination of the single failure events and a simultaneous failure or 
impairment of one of the special safety systems. Coincident failure analysis is a systematic 
assessment of postulated dual failures. 
Consideration of dual failures (i.e. single failure + failure of a safety system) at the design stage 
gives the fundamental design requirements for the safety systems, such as reliability- to ensure 
that the frequency of a dual failure is very low; therefore, the reliability of the safety systems is 
required to be high. 
CANDU6 Electrical Power Systems 
The power supply sources for a generic CANDU 6 plant are as follows, [2]: 
 Redundant offsite sources, which provide electrical power required during startup and 
shutdown of the unit and can also, supply power during normal operating conditions; 
 The turbine generator (onsite), which provides electrical power required during normal 
operation; 
 On site standby sources which provide the electrical power required in case of loss of 
the normal power supply: Class III Standby Diesel Generator (SDG), batteries, 
Emergency Diesel–generator (EPS, Emergency Power Supply). 
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The onsite power distribution system is divided into redundant load groups (EVEN and ODD), 
so that the loss of any one group does not prevent the minimum safety function from being 
performed. Furthermore the onsite station service power supplies are classified as four classes 
that range from uninterruptible power to that which can be interrupted with limited and 
acceptable consequences, provided as follows: 
 Class I: Uninterruptible direct current (dc) supplies for essential auxiliaries, control, 
protection and safety equipment. Batteries provide uninterruptible power for 8 hours. 
 
 Class II: Uninterruptible alternating current (ac) supplies for essential auxiliaries, control, 
protection and safety equipment. Uninterruptible power is provided by batteries, through 
inverters or by Class III during unavailability of the inverters. 
 
 Class III: Power supplies to the safety-related systems. Normal supply of Class III 
distribution system is from Class IV via the service transformers, and it is backed-up by 
100% redundant standby diesel generators with 100% redundancy. Any interruption of 
power is of a short duration (i.e. maximum 180 s), which is necessary for start-up and 
loading of the standby diesel generators. Also, Class III is the charging source to the 
Class I batteries and back-up supply to Class II loads. 
 
 Class IV: Normal alternating current supplies to auxiliaries and equipment, which can 
tolerate long duration interruptions without affecting nuclear safety, personnel or 
equipment safety. A complete loss or a loss of either odd or even division of Class IV 
power will initiate a reactor shutdown. Partial and total loss of Class IV power, including 
loss of offsite power are design basis events which do not pose any safety threat to the 
plant. 
 
Emergency Power Supply System: A completely independent, seismically qualified, 
emergency power supply (EPS) system designed to 100% redundancy and separation 
requirements is also provided to cope with common mode events, ensuring the safety 
functions are maintained. This system is intended for back-up supply supporting 
essential safety functions when all the others electrical supplies are unavailable or when 
the main control room is uninhabitable. 
 
Considering that the EPS buses could allow an electrical connection for the mobile 
Diesel Generator as those provided by the fire fighters, then in accident conditions the 
mobile diesel generator could recover the plant conditions. The fuel supply should be 
provided until the plant gets stable or the offsite grid is recovered. 
2.2 Emergency Water System (EWS) description 
 
Emergency Water System (EWS) is a safety support system of the special safety systems that 
belongs to the second Group of the safety systems. EWS ensures an adequate heat sink for 
decay heat removal following the loss of normal heat removal systems. Facilities are provided 
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for a separate water supply to the steam generators, emergency core cooling (ECC) heat 
exchangers and heat transport system.  
A schematic diagram of the Emergency Water Supply (EWS) system is shown in Figure 2.2, 
from reference [3]. 
 
Figure 2.2 The simplified scheme of the EWS system  
In the following points, the functions that are performed by EWS are described. 
2.2.1 Emergency water supply to Steam Generators 
 
In case the power system is lost or breaks in the feedwater – main and auxiliary - trains occur, 
the EWS provides an independent source of water for the steam generators of up to 30 kg/s. 
From EWS pump a pipeline discharges water into four pipelines inside the reactor building, 
each connecting to an EWS nozzle of the steam generator. Emergency water is ordinary water 
from any considerable water source.   
Air-operated valves outside containment plus check valves at the steam generators inside 
containment provide the necessary segregation between the EWS and steam generator 
secondary side. 
Valve connections to the dousing tank ECC line also allow water to be available for steam 
generator cooling purposes. This provides water to the steam generators until the EWS pumps 
have been started; preferable is to use the demineralised water to the largest possible extent 
from dousing tank instead of the untreated water of the EWS system. As long there is no need, 
either the dousing or the medium pressure ECC system to be available during the accident 
modes, the water from dousing tank can be used for an extended period of time. 
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On short term basis the water for the steam generators can be obtained by opening the valves 
and connecting the ECC injection line to the steam generators. This makes the medium 
pressure ECCS (dousing tank) water available until the EWS pumps have been started. 
 2.2.2 Emergency water supply to the primary heat transport system 
 
EWS is initially provided from the dousing tank (500 m3) via the emergency core cooling piping. 
The ECC valves can be powered by the EPS system to ensure that the ECC piping path is 
available. 
Emptying the dousing tank leaves 1.8 m of water in the reactor building. Water from the main 
EWS pumps is subsequently provided for the heat transport system. One of the ECC recovery 
pumps (0.605 m3/s) is used to re-circulate the water accumulated in the reactor building back 
into the dousing tank until the dousing tank is refilled. 
The water in the dousing tank can then provide makeup to the heat transport circuit by opening 
the supply path as soon as the heat transport pressure falls below the dousing tank head.  
2.2.3 Emergency water supply to ECCS heat exchangers 
 
The EWS system backs up the Recirculated Cooling Water (RCW) system to ensure the 
reliability of supply of cooling water to the ECC heat exchangers during long term ECC 
operation. Long term ECC is required for a period of up to 3 months after a loss of coolant  
accident (LOCA). 
The failure of the RCW system after a SDE should not fail the EWS. A flow of more than 85 l/s 
from the EWS is supplied to the ECC heat exchangers for decay heat removal. This flow is 
supplied from the EWS pump into the recirculated cooling water side of the ECC heat 
exchangers for long term ECC cooling. 
The specific requirement for backup to the RCW for long term ECC operation occurs following a 
LOCA and subsequent failure of the Class IV and Class III power and/or cooling water systems 
due to an earthquake or system unavailability. For this sequence of events, EWS to the ECC 
heat exchangers is not required until a time later than 24 hours after the LOCA. 
2.3 EWS system unavailability analysis 
 
The EWS function unavailability that will be considered for the study is the main EWS function, 
which is the emergency water supply to steam generators. The unavailability study considers 
many simplifications in system configuration due to the lack of official data. The EWS function 
unavailability study considers two different system configurations, which evolved due to such 
studies and feedback operating experience. Currently these configurations are available on 
different CANDU 6 operating units. 
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The current application is meant to demonstrate some of the features and capabilities of IDDA 
code. The goal of the application is to calculate the function unavailability by the use of logical 
statements, probabilistic and logical constraints and not by the use of logical gates as with the 
use of the classical fault trees.  
IDDA approach provides a full representation of the plant states during operation (ordinary, 
incidental or irregular operating conditions), as well as all the possible occurrences (logical and 
phenomenological description of events), expressed in a set of mutually self excluding 
sequences, said constituents. 
The information provided can condition the graph development and allow a right application of 
theory of probability, as inductive logic, often said Bayesian approach. Also the information can 
condition the knowledge about states of successive aleatory events and the development of 
sequences, [4].  
2.3.1 IDDA input file syntax 
 
IDDA approach is based on consistent application of Boolean Logic. The development of the 
universe of the problem and identification of its constituents are done by use of an open graph 
method. The graph development is in comply with the imposed constraints, either logic or 
probabilistic. 
Every branch of graph represents a possible time-trajectory of events with consequent 
progressive increase of logic and phenomenological information. The information can condition 
the graph development and allow a right application of theory of probability, as inductive logic. 
The nodes or pivotal points of each graph are formed by aleatory events. The information about 
the state of nodes can condition the knowledge about states of successive aleatory events and 
the development of their scenarios. 
The information contained by the universe of the problem allows obtaining self-consistent 
solutions, either from phenomenological and/or logic-probabilistical points of view. 
The analyst is required to describe the whole system in a logically consistent manner. 
Description is in form of questions regarding all significant random events related to the 
operation of the system itself, which are called “levels”. 
The level represents the elementary matter of the logical model and also a node in the event 
tree. It describes an uncertainty situation, a pivotal point where the logical path can take 
different courses. 
Each pivotal point (level or question) has: 
 a probability, that represents its expectation degree  
 an uncertainty ratio, that represents the data dispersion, when using failure rate statistics 
to assign the probability  
34 
 
 next level addresses, that link to the following questions depending on the answer to the 
current one  
 a comment string that allows the user to read the logical development of a sequence 
 constraints allow the analyst to modify the input according to the current knowledge 
status. 
The levels or questions are characterized by their possible logical constraints or possible 
probabilistically conditions regarding the given events. In particular the constraints can be 
logical and probabilistically; both of them present a twofold typology. 
The logical constraints have the following functions: 
 Change of address of the following questions or levels in case of success or failure, of 
the considered question or level (i.e. requested change of the logical algorithm). 
 Determination of state (i.e. success or failure) of the following questions or levels, in 
case of success or failure of the considered question or level (i.e. constraints on states 
of the following levels). 
The probabilistically constraints are related to probability evaluations along the event trajectories 
(or time trajectories) that characterize each constituent (scenario). 
The probabilistically constraints have the following twofold typology: 
 
 A first conditioning type of probabilities is assigned to the single events due to 
knowledge of success or failure states of former events. 
 A second conditioning type is related to variations as mission time or waiting times in 
which event probabilities have to be evaluated. The capability to introduce variations 
allows in particular dealing in a simple way with problems where we need to take into 
account single component reparability and restoration times. 
The process of ordering the questions, on the basis of the information available to the analyst, is 
an inductive one by trials and successive corrections. The developed IDDA methodology has as 
fundamental purpose to make systematic and complete exploration of alternatives that are 
possible inside the formulated assumptions, [5]. 
An example of the syntax file with few lines of the input is shown below: 
 
35 
 
 
IDDA syntax file corresponding to the first system configuration is given in the Annex A, while 
the Annex B contains the file that translates the IDDA syntax into normal language that makes 
easier to understand the numbers used to define the logic algorithm of the input file. 
The unavailability analysis considers two system configurations with the goal of showing what 
could be the differences in terms of function unavailability. The first configuration is shown in 
Figure 2.2; a second system configuration is considered, as outlined below.  
The emergency water supply is considering two injection paths or sources. First is the injection 
line from the dousing tank to the secondary side of the steam generator through the two 
pneumatic valves in series. The second alternative from the water source through one out of 
two EWS pumps to the secondary side of the steam generators. 
The second system configuration analyzed considers one more pneumatic valve in parallel for 
each pneumatic valve disposed in series for the first system configuration. 
2.3.2 Study Assumptions for System Unavailability 
 
The present study considers the assumptions presented below. The study is simplified and does 
not have the objective of evaluating the complex and detailed system unavailability. 
 The power supply of the EWS pumps is credited; 
 The water intake necessary for EWS pumps is credited; 
 The pipe intake clogging or pump strainer clogging are not considered; 
 The EWS support systems are credited as available; 
 It is credited that the SGs are depressurized and the EWS pumped supply is possible. 
2.3.3 EWS – Generation of the universe 
 
The problem that has to be solved should be described in the language of the code that after 
develops the Partition (Universe) and its constituents (i.e. event trajectories) in a clear, univocal 
and complete way. The problem is modelled by a sequence of questions, related to true or false 
of subsequent random events. 
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Once the system configuration and operation is described, then the software generates the 
universe of the problem (i.e. all the possible scenarios that can occur). The generated scenarios 
reflect the status of knowledge that the analyst has available. 
Table 2.2 presents the results of this application, without and with the application of a cut-off of 
1.E-12. 
 # Scenarios Generated Residual Probability Partition Entropy 
No cut-off applied 725 0.00 3.119E-01 
Cut-off applied  
(i.e. 1.E-12) 
282 3.576E-11 3.119E-01 
 
Table 2.2 Application of IDDA code to the evaluation of EWS unavailability. 
In case of the first system configuration there are 725 generated scenarios, in the conditions of 
no cut-off applied. In case that a classical cut-off of 1.E-12 which normally is applied in the 
common practices of system unavailability analysis, then the resulted scenarios are 282. 
2.3.3.1 Entropy 
 
Entropy is ubiquitous in physics, and it plays important roles in numerous other disciplines 
ranging from logic and statistics to biology and economics. Entropy is defined differently in 
different contexts, and even within the same domain different notions of entropy are at work. 
Some of these are defined in terms of probabilities, others are not. 
The concept of entropy , besides the entropy from thermodynamics, comes from the Information 
theory. Information theory is a branch of applied mathematics and electrical engineering 
involving the quantification of information. Information theory was developed by Claude E. 
Shannon to find fundamental limits on signal processing operations such as compressing data 
and on reliably storing and communicating data. Since its inception it has broadened to find 
applications in many other areas. 
The most general interpretation of entropy is as a measure of our uncertainty about a system 
and the entropy quantifies the uncertainty involved in predicting the value of a random variable. 
The entropy general formula is the following: 
 
If it is measured the entropy of a dataset S, with respect to one attribute, in this case the target 
attribute is calculated with formula given above, where pi is the proportion of instances in the dataset 
that take the ith value of the target attribute. 
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High Entropy means that the sampling comes from a uniform distribution with a flat histogram, 
therefore having an equal chance of obtaining any possible value. 
Low Entropy means that the distribution varies, it has peaks and valleys.  The histogram of 
frequency distribution would have many lows and maybe one or two highs.  Hence it is more 
predictable. 
Entropy values ranges from 0 (i.e. all instances of a variable have the same value) to 1 (i.e. 
equal number of instances of each value). 
2.3.3.2 Entropy applicability within IDDA 
 
The total number of constituents or event trajectories developed within the universe of problem 
(i.e. partition) is characterized by the entropy of partition that indicates how difficult could be to 
single out the true constituent among all those that have been defined. In case there is a 
reduction in entropy due to some additional information provided then the value shown confirms 
that a pre-existing dominant event has become even more dominant. On the other hand the 
increase of entropy confirms that the function unavailability is shared into a larger number of 
constituents (i.e. scenarios) and therefore presumably into a larger number of causes, too.  
Hence, the entropy measures the degree to which the probability of the system is spread out 
over different possible microstates (constituents or scenarios). 
The entropy concept is shared by the decision trees analyses, which are the bases of 
development of IDDA code. 
2.3.3.3 Unavailability Analysis Results 
 
The unavailability analyses were performed for the two system configurations considered. In the 
following paragraphs are presented the results obtained. In order to outline the form of 
constituents or scenarios generated within the universe of the problem, the most contributing 
scenarios are shown in the following for the two system configurations. 
The constituent/scenario is simply the combination of events that brings to the top event. In 
comparison with the Fault Tree technique, IDDA code gives the constituents set instead of fault-
tree cut set. The difference is that the fault tree cut set is the set of failures that are bringing to 
the Top Event occurrence and on the other side, IDDA constituent set is a set of successes and 
failures that cause the Top event, therefore it is logically incompatible with all the constituents. 
Below are presented the most contributing scenarios to the top event unavailability 
corresponding to both system configurations. 
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System configuration 1 – most contributing scenario 
 
System configuration 2 – most contributing scenario 
 
Table 2.3 presents the results obtained for the two system configurations considered. 
Analyses Results Configuration 1 Configuration 2 
Number of scenarios (cut-off 1.E-12) 282 362 
Number of scenarios that lead to Top 
Unavailability 
212/282 206/362 
Q [f/demand] - Unavailability 1.168E-03 2.196E-05 
Entropy 3.119E-01 3.122E-01 
Most contributing scenario on the total 
Q top unavailability 
1.0648E-03 (91.1%) 1.245E-05 (56.7%) 
Minimal Cut Sets 212 206 
 
Table 2.3 Results of the application of IDDA code to the evaluation of EWS unavailability  
The results obtained proof the fact that the system configuration 2 is categorically an 
improvement, because corresponds to a system unavailability decrease by 2 orders of 
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magnitude.  Figure 2.4 shows graphically these results for the function unavailability of the top 
event analyzed. 
 
Figure 2.4. Unavailability of the two EWS system configurations 
Also, the entropy values obtained for the two partitions resulted confirms that for configuration 2 
there is an increase of entropy, i.e. the function unavailability is shared into a larger number of 
constituents (i.e. scenarios) and therefore into a larger number of causes, too.  
The same as the Fault tree method, the IDDA code can give the Minimal Cut Sets (MCS) of the 
top events analyzed. The number of MCS resulted is the same as the number of scenarios that 
lead to top event unavailability. As it has been said previously IDDA constituent is a set of 
successes and failures that cause the Top event, removing the random events that are 
successful remain in fact the minimal cut set. 
Below are presented the first three minimal cut sets resulted for the both system configurations. 
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System configuration 2 
 
 
2.4. EWS - “RISK“ Analysis 
 
The definition of risk over the years took various forms among the people involved in the risk 
assessment, but common agreement has been found for the following formula, expressed 
below: 
 
 
The present sub-chapter presents some specific capabilities of IDDA code. The purpose is to 
present a risk analysis in respect to the reparation times of the components of the EWS 
systems. The analyses consider the two system configurations of the main function that have 
been analyzed in the previous sub-chapter. 
Therefore the analyses are meant to quantify the risk resulted/expected once consequences as 
reparation times are associated to the components of EWS system.  
In case of a CANDU 6 plant transient, EWS system might be requested to mitigate accident 
consequences. EWS system is a safety support system that could be used over long term 
periods, i.e. more than 24 hours, so the possibility of components reparation should be 
considered. 
Usually, such analyses are not possible with the existing codes available on the market and 
used in the probabilistic safety assessments of the nuclear power plants. Currently, some 
studies were performed on systems, such as spent fuel pool cooling systems, using the 
Markovian approach, but it cannot handle too many components. 
Risk = Probability of occurrence * Consequence 
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The present application considers the reparation of all active components of the EWS system 
configuration.  
The input data that have been used for the analysis are given in Table 2.4. 
IDDA 
Level 
Eq. - 
Failure 
mode 
λ 
[1/h] 
λ 
[1/d] 
TM 
[h] 
Ti 
[days] 
EF CoVar MTTR [h] QM Source(s) 
5 External 
Large 
Leak 
3.93E-
08 
 24  8.4 0.720 No MTTR 
for passive 
equipment. 
9.43E-
07 
[6], [7] 
6 PV41MNT  1.E-06   10 0.795  1.E-06  
7 SV41  9.54E-
04 
  8.4 0.720 5 9.54E-
04 
[6], [7] 
8 PV41PF 1.5E-
06 
  672 4.3 0.466 4 5.04E-
04 
[6], [7] 
9 PV7MNT  1.E-06   10 0.795  1.E-06  
10 SV7  9.54E-
04 
  8.4 0.720 5 9.54E-
04 
[6], [7] 
11 PV7PF 1.5E-
06 
  672 4.3 0.466 4 5.04E-
04 
[6], [7] 
12 CV49.O  1.30E-
05 
  8.4 0.720 9 1.30E-
05 
[6], [7] 
15 HS41.HE  1.E-02   10 0.795  1.E-02  
16 HS41 4.6E-
07 
  672 5 0.520 3 1.5E-
04 
[6], [7] 
17 HS7.HE  1.E-02   10 0.795  1.E-02  
18 HS7 4.6E-
07 
  672 5 0.520 3 1.5E-
04 
[6], [7] 
80 EWSPs. 
HE 
 6.E-03   10 0.795  6.E-03 [6], [7] 
90 P1.MNTC  2.E-02   5 0.520  2.E-02 [6], [7] 
105 P1Fs.CCF  8.E-05   5 0.520  8.E-05  
110 P1Fst  2.23E-
03 
  4.7 0.497 150 2.23E-
03 
[6], [7] 
120 P1Fr.CCF  8.4E-
05 
  5 0.520  8.4E-
05 
 
130 P1Frun 4.54E-
06 
 24  3.3 0.375 21 1.08E-
04 
[6], [7] 
140 V9V11CCF  2.47E-
06 
  5 0.520  2.47E-
06 
 
150 V9.O  1.30E-
05 
  8.4 0.720 8 1.30E-
05 
[6], [7] 
160 V10.O  2.5E-
03 
  10 0.795 4 2.5E-
03 
 
170 V45.C  7.E-05   8.4 0.720 6 7.E-05  
180 V44.O  1.30E-   8.4 0.720 6 1.30E-  
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05 05 
190 V47.C  7.E-05   8.4 0.720 6 7.E-05 [6], [7] 
260 P2Fs.CCF  8.E-05   5 0.520  8.E-05  
270 P2Fst  2.23E-
03 
  4.7 0.497 150 2.23E-
03 
 
280 P2Fr.CCF  8.4E-
05 
  5 0.520  8.4E-
05 
 
290 P2Frun 4.54E-
06 
 24  3.3 0.375 21 1.08E-
04 
 
300 V11V9CCF  2.47E-
06 
  5 0.520  2.47E-
06 
 
310 V11.O  1.30E-
05 
  8.4 0.720 8 1.30E-
05 
 
320 V12.O  2.5E-
03 
  10 0.795 4 2.5E-
03 
 
 
Table 2.4 Input data considered for unavailability and risk analyses 
For calculating the component unavailability in case there is no test interval considered, the 
following formula has been applied: 
Qm = λ * TM 
where: 
Qm – average unavailability 
λ – component failure rate 
TM – mission time 
The components that have been considered subjected to testing have applied the following 
formula for quantification of the component unavailability: 
Qm = λ * Ti/2 
where: 
Qm – average unavailability 
λ – component failure rate 
Ti – test interval 
For the redundant components, group of two, an approximation method has been used for the 
quantitative evaluation of CCFs. The method used was the β factor method. 
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In this method, the likelihood of the CCF is evaluated in relation to the random failure rate for 
the component. A β factor is estimated such that β% of the failure rate is attributed to the CCF 
and (1- β) % to the random failure rate of the component. The beta value used was β = 0.1 
2.4.1 Complementary cumulative density function (CCDF) 
 
The complementary cumulative density function is called also the “Risk curve”. The IDDA code 
through the use of the different sets of commands and following the consideration of associated 
consequences, such reparation times, economical costs or any type of consequence can give in 
output the CCDF that characterizes the partition, in particular EWS system configurations. 
CCDF is a feature of IDDA and is a common used tool in the risk assessment. 
In particular, for the EWS risk assessment, the CCDF consists of plots on log-log graph that 
indicates the probability versus consequence.  
The knowledge of the CCDF allows the risk analyst to see what is the probability to have a 
certain consequence either below or above a given limit, and moreover to consider if the 
probability is acceptable or not acceptable. 
2.4.1.1 CCDF – Theoretical considerations 
 
In probability theory and statistics, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) describes the 
probability that a real-valued random variable X with a given probability distribution will be found 
at a value less than or equal to x. 
For every real number x, the cumulative distribution function of a real-valued random variable X 
is given by: 
 
where: 
The right-hand side represents the probability that the random variable X takes on a value less 
than or equal to x. 
The CDF of a continuous random variable X can be defined in terms of its probability density 
function ƒ as follows: 
 
Complementary cumulative distribution function – sometimes it is useful to study the opposite 
question and ask how often the random variable is above a particular level. This is called the 
complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) or simply the tail distribution or 
exceedance, and is defined as: 
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Area to the right of the x = b line is: GX (b), this is the probability that X is greater than b. 
Below, Figure 2.5 shows the graphical meaning of a complementary cumulative distribution 
function.  
 
Figure 2.5 Complementary cumulative distribution function 
2.4.1.2 Complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDF) results 
 
An ordering by decreasing consequence allows getting the Complementary Cumulative 
Distribution Function (CCDF) of that quantity that is the consequence (e.g. reparation times) by 
progressively cumulating constituent probabilities. In fact, it gives for each consequence value 
the probability of having a consequence not lower than this value. The complementary 
cumulative distribution function resulted after the consideration of all input data for the first 
system configuration is shown in the Figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6. CCDF resulted for the first EWS system configuration 
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As it has been said before the CCDF helps the risk analyst to see what could be the probability 
to have a certain consequence. For instance, the probability to have a high consequence like 
100 hours unavailability due to equipment reparations is very low and on the reverse when the 
probability is quite high the consequence is low. 
The compared CCDFs obtained for both system configurations are shown below in Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7. CCDFs comparison for the both EWS system configurations 
The CCDF comparison of the two system configuration shows that the system configuration with 
redundancy for the two pneumatic valves presents lower consequences and lower probabilities; 
therefore the improvement of system configuration is worthy and brings evident benefits. 
 2.4.1.3 Identification of the critical aleatory events  
 
Another feature of IDDA code is that it allows the risk analyst to identify the critical aleatory 
events that have significant contribution to the total risk within the considered partition. 
Once the consequence is given (i.e. associated) to the basic events, whatever they are, either 
different type of consequence or different type of basic event (e.g. equipment, human action) 
the code generates the results in respect of the interested issue. The most significant aleatory 
events that contribute to the total risk could be presented in the form of single failures, the same 
as MCS of one order or in combination with other basic events failures, again the same as the 
MCS of great orders. As would be expected the combination of multiple basic events failure has 
less contribution as the failure of a single basic event. 
For instance, for the two system configurations proposed, once the reparation times have been 
given to the code, it was of special interest to identify which are the critical components that 
have the most significant contribution to the total “risk”. 
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The results obtained for the first system configuration are shown below in the Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8 Significant risk contributors for EWS Configuration 1 
The IDDA code output has the following format, shown below. In particular, the two most 
important basic events failure that have significant risk contribution are presented. The output 
file lists the causes that contribute to the risk in the decreased order. The output file registers 
the mnemonic that reminds the name of basic event, the level assigned in the input file, the 
value with which contributes to the risk, the percentual contribution to the total risk and the 
number of scenarios involved with the failure of the specific basic event(s); moreover they are 
presented in the decreased order of their contribution to the risk, see below Figure 2.9. 
43%
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Figure 2.9 IDDA output –  risk contribution for the failure of the first two significant basic events 
of EWS configuration 1 
Again for comparison purpose, it has been analyzed also the system configuration 2 and its 
critical aleatory events that lead to risk, presented below in Figure 2.10. 
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Figure 2.10. Significant risk contributors for EWS Configuration 2 
Below in Figure 2.11 is shown the IDDA output for the failure of the first two significant basic 
events. 
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Figure 2.11 IDDA output –  risk contribution for the failure of the first two significant basic 
events. 
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The risk results obtained for both system configurations show the importance of the solenoid 
valves that actuate the pneumatic valves, and also the importance of the pneumatic valves in 
the system configuration for ensuring the water supply to the secondary side of the steam 
generators. The results also highlight the importance of the check valve that is before the 
entrance to the steam generator. The results are expectable due to the fact that the components 
that proved to be important for the risk belong to the common water header before the water 
supply is split.The difference registered between the two system configurations in terms of risk 
is that the number of scenarios involved is bigger for the system configuration 2, that is due to 
the bigger partition number generated once the redundancy has been considered. 
However in this mode the risk analyst is provided with the necessary tools and information for a 
complete “risk” analysis that could be a very useful input for the decision making process. The 
analyst is provided with the necessary information in regard to the random events on which to 
intervene with priority in order to decrease the risk. It should be reminded that the product 
probability by consequence in not the risk (in decision sense), it’s simply the contribution to the 
expected consequence value. In fact it lacks the utility factor that changes the expected 
consequence into decision risk. Only by considering the utility factor the expected value could 
be effectively transferred in decisional parameter, risk. 
2.5. Conclusions 
 
The set of codes that constitutes IDDA analysis methodology is a very articulate system that 
has the right answers to almost all analysis requests and needs. The methodology has been 
designed for complex situations and actually in those the code shows its real potentialities. 
These types of results have a great importance to orient the course of the analysis or to be 
considered as valuable inputs for the decision making process.  
The present applications have proved only partly the potentialities of the code, mainly the most 
important features, but there are still features that were not presented due to the lack of space 
and scope of the applications. 
Other IDDA potentialities that are worthy to be mentioned are the following: 
 Evaluation of weight of uncertainties 
 Single component reliability vs. time 
 Availability of reparable components vs. time 
 CCDF for system/component unavailability 
 Out of service times 
The scope of applications was only to show some of the potentialities of the IDDA methodology 
in the given framework of the input data limits, and not to underline and weaknesses of any 
existing risk assessment methodology. Due to the fact there is not an official input data in regard 
to system operation and exact configuration, no specific conclusions could be withdrawn in 
respect to the EWS system or CANDU 6  plant design. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. 1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 represents the core applications of the present work. The applications purpose is the 
coupling between the logic probabilistics of the system or plant and associated phenomenology 
of primary heat transport system of a generic CANDU 6 NPP. 
The first application consists in the coupling between the logic-probabilistic model of EWS 
system and the associated phenomenology of primary heat transport system of CANDU 6 NPP. 
The considered plant transient is the total Loss of Main Feed-water with or without the 
coincident failure of the Emergency Water Supply System.  
The second application is considering the CANDU 6 Station Blackout as plant transient, 
moreover the loss of all AC power sources existing on the site. The transient scenarios 
development considers the possibility to recover the offsite grid and the use of mobile diesel 
generators in order to mitigate the accident consequences. The purpose of the analysis is to 
challenge the plant design and response and to check if the plant conditions of a severe 
accident are reached. The plant response is challenged for short and long periods of time. 
The IDDA code allows interfacing the logic-probabilistic model of the system with the plant 
response in time, therefore with the evolution in time of the plant process variables. 
This allows raising sequences of possible events related in cause-consequence reasoning, 
each one giving place to a scenario with its development and its consequences. Therefore this 
allows acquiring the knowledge not only of which sequences of events are taking place, but also 
of the real environment in which they are taking place. Associating the system sequences that 
lead to system unavailability on demand with the resulting phenomenology proved to be a useful 
tool for the decision making process, both in the design phase and for the entire power plant life 
time. 
3.2 CANDU 6 Design - Safety philosophy 
 
The safety philosophy of CANDU reactors, based upon the principle of defense-in-depth, 
employs redundancy (i.e. using at least two components or systems for a given function), 
diversity (i.e. using two physically or functionally different means for a given function), 
separation (i.e. using barriers and/or distance to separate components or systems for a given 
function), and protection (seismically and environmentally qualifying all safety systems, 
equipment, and structures). 
An important aspect of implementing defense-in-depth in the CANDU 6 design is the provision 
of a series of physical barriers to confine radioactive material at specified locations. As usual, in 
CANDU 6 design these barriers are the fuel matrix, the fuel sheath (clad), the Heat Transport 
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System (HTS), and the Containment. An additional administrative barrier is the exclusion area 
boundary, [1]. 
The following points are briefly listing the key safety features2 of CANDU 6 design: 
 CANDU 6 reactors have two separate, redundant fail-safe shutdown systems, (one 
seismically qualified); also the secondary control room is seismically qualified; 
 
 Large volume of cooling water is contained in the dousing tank of the reactor building 
(approx. 3000 tonnes), ready to suppress the containment pressure or to cool by gravity 
the reactor core; 
 
 CANDU 6 reactor core includes a large volume of low-temperature, low pressure 
moderator water (approx 260 tonnes), which provides an inherent backup heat sink. The 
large thermal capacity of this water and the surrounding shielding vault water (approx 
600 tonnes) provides an interim heat sink. 
 
 Feedwater shutdown cooling and moderator systems operate under CLASS IV and 
CLASS III power (independent diesel generators); 
 
 If CLASS IV and CLASS III power are unavailable, seismically qualified EPS 
(Emergency Power Supply) will be started, in this case, pumped Emergency Water 
Supply (EWS) operating under EPS can ensure long term fuel cooling; 
 
 Following total loss of off-site (CLASS IV) and on-site (CLASS III) power, the steam 
generator heat sink is maintained by make-up to steam generators by gravity from the 
dousing tank (EWS supply by gravity from dousing tank), after steam generator rapid 
cooldown; 
 
 The natural uranium fuel bundles of CANDU 6 are gradually discharged during reactor 
operation and are stored in the bay for about 6 years, before they can be moved to 
passive air-cooled dry storage. 
3.3 CANDU 6 NPP – Total Loss of Main Feedwater (TLOMFW) transient 
3.3.1 Total Loss of Main Feedwater (TLOMFW) transient description 
 
The Total Loss of Main Feedwater is an internal event plant transient that corresponds to a 
failure of the secondary side plant circuits. Initial Event (IE) can be a loss of the three main feed 
water pump trains (including valves), but conservatively is considered that also the auxiliary 
feedwater pump is lost. 
                                                             
2  http://enformable.com/2011/11/nuclear-electrica-cernavoda-nuclear-candu-6/ 
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The cause of loss could be due to loss of power supply to the main feedwater pumps, or due to 
a pipe break. The break could be located in the feedwater header. The break is conservatively 
assumed to be symmetric and consequently affects all steam generators in the same manner. 
Table 3.1, presents the plant response associated to the accident of Total Loss of Main 
Feedwater (TLOMFW) 
Table 3.1 Plant response associated to the TLOMFW accident  
Plant 
response 
Description 
1 All the systems of the power plant are available. 
Immediately after initial occurrence, due to pressure drop of the feedwater flow a 
reactor trip occurs.  
Following the reactor trip, the heat rate transfer to secondary side decreases and 
this causes a drop in secondary circuit pressure. The turbine is isolated by the 
closure of the governor valves in the attempt to maintain constant boiler pressure. 
The main feedwater pumps are also tripped immediately after IE occurrence, on 
high motor current due to the excessive flow. 
Auxiliary Feedwater pump will automatically start but it cannot supply sufficient 
water to the steam generators because a part of feedwater flow will be lost 
through the break. Auxiliary Feedwater pump will trip on high pump motor current 
due to the excessive flow.  
Boiler pressure is controlled by using condenser steam discharge valves 
(CSDV's) or atmospheric steam discharge valves (ASDVs) to relief steam and 
boiler level by Boiler Level Control (BPC) program. If ASDV's or CSDV's are 
unavailable then MSSV's will be used for steam relief. 
Due to the feedwater supply failure to the SG's, the operator should initiate 
cooldown process. The cooldown process can be made in two ways: with BPC 
and SG's until the SG's level drop below -8 meters and after that continuing with 
SDCS down to 54 °C or directly with SDCS from 260 °C down to 54 °C. When the 
PHTS temperature drops below 90 °C, the PHTS can be depressurized from 6.5 
MPa to 1.0 MPa. 
EWS short term system is blocked every time when SDCS system is brought into 
service. As long as SDCS is available, the plant remains in a stable end state (6.5 
MPa and 125 °C or 1.0 MPa and 54 °C). 
2 If SDCS system is unavailable, the operator must initiate SG's depressurization in 
order to bring into service low pressure water supply systems to SG's: Boiler 
Make-up Water (EWS short term) or pumped Emergency Water Supply (EWS 
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long term) system. 
The operator will open 8 out of 16  main steam safety valves (MSSV's) and when 
the steam generators pressure decrease below 345 kPa, the water from the 
dousing tank will feed by gravity the SG's.  
If the operator does not depressurize the boilers, then boiler auto-
depressurization is automatically initiated. Auto-depressurization will be enabled if 
the level in at least two steam generators will be below -2.6 m for 20 consecutive 
minutes and is conditioned by the feedwater header pressure below 4.93 MPa. 
If the EWS short term system fails, the operator will initiate EWS pumped (i.e. 
long term water supply) system to provide water supply to the SG's.  
The end stable state for this sequence is at 120 °C.  
3 In case EWS systems (i.e. short term and long term water supplies) fail and 
concomitant with the feedwater supply lost, and without SDCS, then the plant end 
state will be core damage. 
4 In case that secondary side water make up cannot be ensured, then primary 
water makeup is considered via emergency core cooling systems (ECCS). 
If ECCS make-up to primary circuit fails, then the operator initiates the EWS 
system to primary in order to ensure full primary heat transport system inventory. 
The same number of MSSV's (8 out of 16, or 4 out of 8 for one loop reactor) is 
required to depressurize the primary circuit that further allows the EWS make-up.  
5 Without any make-up to primary circuit, the primary circulation is ensured by two-
phase thermosyphoning. This heat removal mechanism requires two SG's per 
loop available and supplied continuously with low pressure feedwater (i.e. 
emergency water supply - EWS). As long as both SG's per loop are effective in 
heat removal the plant will be into a stable end state. 
 
3.3.2 Thermal-hydraulic model assumptions 
 
The main assumptions that stay at the basis of the thermal-hydraulic model are the following: 
 Only one loop out of two, half reactor is modeled; 
 The Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) is not credited as available, therefore it is not 
modeled in the thermal-hydraulic model; 
 The Degasser/Condenser (DC) is not modeled. The PHTS inventory discharged from 
Pressurizer through the Liquid Relief Valves to the Degasser/Condenser (DC) tank is 
credited as successful; 
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 The Auxiliary Feedwater pump operation is neither credited, nor modeled in the thermal-
hydraulic model. 
 The ECCS system to provide make-up to PHTS is not credited, nor modeled in the 
thermal-hydraulic model; 
 CLASS IV and CLASS III power are credited as available; 
 The moderator is not credited as ultimate heat sink, therefore it is not modeled in the 
thermal-hydraulic model. 
 The Atmospheric Steam Discharge Valves (ASDV) and Condenser Steam Discharge 
Valve (CSDV) are considered conservatively as unavailable. 
 The 2 SGs of the loop are credited as available, therefore no need for EWS make-up to 
the PHTS. 
3.3.3 RELAP 5 – CANDU 6 thermal-hydraulic model description  
Four half circuits complete the two figure of 8 that are designed for heat removal and steam 
generation. A half circuit contains a main circulation pump and a steam generator. The main 
circulation pump takes heavy water that has passed through the steam generator, pumps it 
through the inlet headers, the reactor core and the outlet headers, and back into the steam 
generator. Heavy water flows through the steam generators and transfer heat to water to form 
steam. The steam flows out of the top of the steam generator to the turbines. The inlet headers 
distributes the heavy water to individual fuel channels and the outlet header collects heavy 
water from the individual fuel channels and directs it to the steam generator, [2]. 
A typical CANDU heat transport system is shown in Figure 3.1 below. 
 
Figure 3.1. CANDU 6 Primary Heat transport system and pressure inventory control system 
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The RELAP5/Mod.3.3 input model of the CANDU 6 reactor design has been developed 
independently in the frame of the present work. The geometrical and process data correspond 
to a full vertical-scale representation of a CANDU 6 heat transport system. 
The input model is designed so that reactor typical conditions, such as fluid mass flux, pressure 
and enthalpy, can be achieved in the primary and secondary side for both forced and natural 
circulation. The thermal-hydraulic model considers half of reactor, only one loop of the "figure-
of-eight" geometry of a CANDU 6 design. The model considers one horizontal channel per pass 
and a 1:1 scaling of the vertical elevations throughout the loop. 
Each six-meter-long fuel channel is connected to the end-fitting, i.e. inlet and outlet feeders. 
One fuel channel is simulating 95 fuel channels, actually one quarter from the total number of 
fuel channels that pass the Calandria vessel. 
The steam generators are scaled approximately 1:1 with typical CANDU steam generators, in 
terms of tube diameter, mass and heat fluxes. The secondary-sides of the steam generators 
contain an internal pre-heater and an external down-comer. Primary fluid circulation is provided 
by two centrifugal pumps. These deliver full reactor typical head (about 210 m) at flow rates 
similar to a single reactor channel. Primary circuit pressure is maintained by the pressuriser. 
 
The thermal-hydraulic model is equipped with the Emergency Water System (EWS) that 
provides water make-up to the secondary side of steam generators under postulated conditions 
of consequent failure of main and auxiliary feedwater systems. The EWS system is actuated by 
the secondary side pressure with the water injection when pressure drops below a 
predetermined value, i.e. 345 kPa. 
The half loop modeled is made of the following main components: 
 2 steam generators 
 2 reactor coolant pumps 
 2 horizontal fuel channels 
 2 reactor inlet headers 
 2 reactor outlet headers  
 Inlet feeders 
 Outlet feeders 
The thermal-hydraulic RELAP5 nodalization has been achieved through a number of volumes 
and inter-connecting junctions, valves, heat slabs and component-specific models such as 
pump, separator, etc. 
The system controls are modeled through trip cards, which accept logical inputs based on time, 
pressure and other thermal-hydraulic parameters. The power trip, steam generators 
depressurization, EWS pump activation, etc., are controlled also through the trip cards. 
In the following it is presented the modeling of main components of the primary and secondary 
circuits, such as: 
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 Header, Feeder and Fuel Channel Modeling 
 
Each fuel channel is discretised into 12 axial volumes to obtain the axial distribution of thermal-
hydraulic parameters. Each fuel element that transfers heat to the coolant, is modeled with a 
RELAP5 specific heat generating heat structure component. The fuel pins are combined into a 
single fuel pin heat structure maintaining the surface area, mass and equivalent heated 
perimeter corresponding to the 95 fuel channels simulated. The power ramp down during the 
transient is given in a tabular form in the code. 
The heat structure that models the fuel element is at the external side in contact with the 
primary coolant. Moreover another heat structure has been put in place to model the pressure 
tube that is in contact at internal side with the primary coolant and at the external side directly 
with the moderator – heavy water that has imposed a constant water temperature of 70 °C. 
The present thermal-hydraulic model of the fuel channel did not consider the modeling neither of 
calandria tube and, consequently, nor of the annulus gas that is between the pressure tube and 
the calandria tube. Thus the simulation of pressure tube drop on the calandria tube when the 
pressure tube heat-up is not modeled, fact that could lead to optimistic temperature values for 
the primary coolant, fuel sheath and moderator. 
However, the phenomenon, i.e. pressure tube deformation takes place under certain postulated 
conditions, such as LOCAs with concomitant loss of ECCS when the complete voiding had 
occurred. The transients studied in the present work do not present these conditions (at least in 
the considered time period for the Station Black-out) and consequently the phenomenon is 
disregarded. 
The inlet and outlet feeders nodalised have 11 volumes maintaining the pipe length and 
elevation. In the setup, the intake and off-take branches such as reactor coolant pump injection, 
feeder connection, etc., are connected to the header at different axial locations. Accordingly the 
main header is discretised into four axial volumes. 
 
 Steam Generator Modeling 
 
The steam generator U-Tubes are segregated into ten volumes including inlet and outlet plenum 
volumes. The U-Tube volumes are attached with heat slabs, forming the thermal linkage 
between the primary and secondary system. The secondary system consists of riser, drum and 
downcomer volumes.  
A RELAP5 specific separator component, attached with the drum volume, is used to separate 
out steam and water.  
The drum volume is modeled using a pipe component. The U-Tube heat slabs are connected to 
the two volumes of the riser portion. One single volume downcomer connects the drum inlet to 
the secondary riser inlet. 
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The main feedwater from a time-dependent volume is injected into the riser portion and mixes 
with the saturated water from the downcomer. It picks up heat from the U-tubes, converts into a 
two-phase mixture and rises in the riser volume. At the exit of the riser this two-phase mixture 
enters the separator volume. The steam from the separator moves to the upper portion of the 
drum volume and the saturated liquid falls back into the lower portion of the drum volume. The 
bottom volume of the drum is connected to the downcomer. The feed flow and temperature are 
given as time dependent boundary conditions. 
 Primary Heat Transport Pump Modeling 
 
The primary heat transport pump is modeled using the RELAP5 in-built Bingham Pump 
characteristics. The rated flow, speed and head are provided. 
 
 Emergency Water Supply/Auxiliary Feedwater System Modeling 
The emergency water and auxiliary feedwater system the same as the main feedwater system 
is considered as being a time-dependent volume. The emergency/auxiliary water flow and 
temperature are given as time dependent boundary conditions. 
The EWS pumps are simulated using time-dependent junctions whose flow characteristics are 
given as functions of downstream discharge pressure.  
 
 Pressurizer Modeling 
 
The pressuriser is made of a time dependent volume and a pipe discretized in 9 volumes. The 
connection between the pressuriser and pipe is done via a trip valve, which should close after 
steady state 
 
 Calandria (Moderator) Modeling 
The Calandria, actually the moderator is modeled through the use of heat structures modules. 
The temperatures are given for the left and right sides. One external side to the fuel sheath 
(represented also with heat structures) is the moderator temperature (70 Celsius degrees) that 
keeps constant, and one internal side that cools down the fuel sheath temperature. Therefore 
the moderator temperature follows the trend of the fuel sheath temperature, but acts as a heat 
sink. 
 
The main purpose of heavy water moderator in calandria vessel is to provide a mean to slow 
down high energy fission neutrons to the appropriate thermal energy level to promote further 
nuclear fission.  Moreover the moderator removes the heat that is continuously generated in the 
moderator as a result of heat production associated with neutron moderation and gamma ray 
absorption processes, transfers the heat from the pressure tubes across the annular gap to the 
calandria tubes, and lastly transfers the heat from reactor structures.  
 
The moderator thus constitutes a distributed, low pressure emergency heat sink surrounding 
each fuel channel, [3]. 
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 Others Modeling 
 
The steam produced in the steam generators can be directed either to the turbine, modeled by a 
time dependent volume through a valve connection, either can be released to the atmosphere 
through a valve connection that has the same flow area as 4 main steam safety valves. The 
steam released through the main steam safety valves is discharged in a time dependent 
volume.  
The nominal initial conditions for the thermal-hydraulic model and the temperature and pressure 
distributions along the circuit are given in Table 3.2. 
Main  Parameters Thermal-hydraulic model parameters 
Reactor headers 
Reactor Inlet Header temperature [K] 539.15 
Reactor Outlet Header temperature [K] 583.15 
Reactor Inlet Header pressure [bar] 113.5 
Reactor Outlet Header pressure [bar] 99.9 
Steam Generators 
SG inlet pressure [bar] 97.4 
SG inlet temperature [K] 582.15 
SG inlet enthalpy [kJ/kg] 1395 
SG outlet pressure [bar] 94.7 
SG outlet temperature [K] 539.15 
SG outlet enthalpy [kJ/kg] 1163 
Heat transferred to secondary side/SG 
[MWth] 
516 
SG steam flowrate [kg/s] 254 
Pressure at drum nozzle [bar] 47 
Temperature at drum nozzle [K] 533.15 
Enthalpy [kJ/kg] 2808 
Quality at drum exit [%] 99.75 
Pressure at turbine [bar] 45.5 
Primary pump 
Suction pressure [bar] 95.4 
Discharge pressure [bar] 113.4 
Flowrate [kg/s] 2224 
Head [m] 210 
Main feedwater 
Temperature [K] 460.15 
Pressure [bar] 48 
Enthalpy [kJ/kg] 794 
Flowrate [kg/s] 254 
Emergency water 
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Emergency water temperature [K] 305.15 
Emergency water pumped pressure [bar] 10 
Emergency water dousing tank pressure 
[bar] 
4.8 
 
Table 3.2 Main input data used for the thermal-hydraulic model 
 
The RELAP5 model, that simulates the CANDU 6 power plant transient, is supposed to be in 
the following conditions and generates the resulting events sequence, see below Table 3. In 
order to see the trends of PHTS temperature and SG Downcomer Level, the total time for which 
the transients have been simulated is 5000 seconds. 
By applying the energy balance equation (see below) between the primary and secondary side 
process parameters resulted following the steady state conditions, confirms that the system is 
well balanced and furthermore the different accident situations can be simulated. 
 
Q primary flowrate * (HSG outlet-HSG inlet) = Q secondary flowrate * (Hsteam –Hfeedwater) 
 
Table 3.3, presents the comparison between the parameters obtained in the frame of the 
present work and the operational parameters for Cernavoda unit 2. 
 
Primary side Secondary side 
 
THERMAL BALANCE SG in SG out STEAM FEED WATER 
C
ER
N
A
VO
D
A
 
2 
N
PP P [bar] 97.8 94.7 45.5 48.26 
T [°C] 309 266 260 187 
H [kJ/kg] 1395 1163 2805 796 
M [kg/s] 2224 2224 257 257 
Q [MWth] 515.968 516.313 
THERMAL BALANCE SG in SG out STEAM FEED WATER 
EXPER
IM
EN
TA
L 
TH
 M
odel 
P [bar] 100 97 45.5 48 
T [°C] 309 266 260 187 
H [kJ/kg] 1395 1162 2808 794 
M [kg/s] 2214 2212 254 254 
Q [MWth] 515.862 511.556 
 
Table 3.3 Thermal balance comparison 
Table 3.4, presents the pressure losses along the circuits, for both the thermal-hydraulic model 
and operational CANDU 6 of Cernavoda, unit 2.  
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ΔP - Pressure Losses (bar) CERNAVODA 2 NPP MODEL 
R Inlet Header  - R Outlet Header 13.6 13.2 
Pump Discharge-Suction 18.1 17.8 
SG in-out 3.1 3 
 
Table 3.4 System pressure losses comparison 
The RELAP5 thermal-hydraulic input that reproduces the steady state conditions of a CANDU6 
reactor is given in Annex C, i.e. the nodalization of the thermal-hydraulic model.  
The following graphs will confirm the steady state conditions of the thermal-hydraulic model 
developed. In order to confirm that the plant conditions are stable, a computation of 1000 
seconds is performed. The following figures present the plant parameters for a period of 1000 
seconds.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Main feedwater flowrate  
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Figure 3.3 SG steam flowrate 
 
Figure 3.4 Steam Generator steam title 
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Figure 3.5 Power of one equivalent fuel channel  
The above mentioned figures shows that the thermal-hydraulic model is a balanced plant, 
confirmed by the energy balance between the primary and secondary side circuits, the quality of 
steam supplied to the turbine and the power developed by the reactor, i.e. a quarter of the total 
core of a CANDU6 reactor. 
 
3.3.4 IDDA Input – Logic-probabilistics model 
 
For this application the EWS system availability is considered, with the two possibilities of 
emergency water supply for short and long term. For the short term supply, the emergency 
water is supplied by gravity from dousing tank that is contained in the upper side of the reactor 
building, while for the long term supply the emergency water is pumped from whatever water 
source.  
The present application considers the EWS configuration 1 presented in the previous chapter 
(i.e. chapter 2), with the difference (between the input syntax files) is that the current one  is 
considering also the impact of the instrumentation and control equipment on the actuation of the 
pneumatic valves that are on the path of water supply to the steam generator.   
 
The differences introduced between the two input files have led to differences in system 
unavailability and number of scenarios (i.e. constituents) generated; the unavailabilities obtained 
for the two system possibilities of emergency water supply are shown below in Table 3.6. The 
same as for the previous application, a cutoff of 1.E-12 has been applied to the end state 
probabilities of the constituents generated inside the partition. 
Table 3.5 Top events unavailabilities for short and long term emergency water supply 
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 Number of constituents Q –Unavailability [unavailability/demand] 
EWS short 
term 
1751/2712 3.282E-02 
EWS long 
term 
805/2712 2.118E-04 
 
For the current application the results that have been highlighted during the first application are 
not anymore of interest. Special attention is given to the scenarios with the highest unavailability  
for short and long term emergency water supply that yield within the given system configuration. 
For instance the scenario with the highest unavailability for the short term emergency water 
supply is shown below in Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6 Most contributing scenario for the system unavailability 
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3.4 DYNAMIC PSA procedure description 
 
The dynamic PSA approach is achieved through the use of the I.D.D.A (Integrated Dynamic 
Decision Analysis) code. IDDA allows interfacing the logic-probabilistic model of the system at 
study with the plant response in time, therefore with the evolution in time of the plant process 
variables. 
The Dynamic PSA coupling procedure is sketched in Figure 3.7 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 The dynamic PSA coupling procedure  
The aim is to obtain for each accident sequence of the partition developed by IDDA the 
associated plant or system phenomenology. The process variables that are of interest for the 
analyst and further for the decision making process are identified, selected, and transferred from 
the thermal-hydraulic code to the special created subroutine in FORTRAN. 
 
The phenomenology that corresponds to a certain transient could be described in a FORTRAN 
simulator either physically; giving a set of equations that describes the variable as a function of 
time, or by giving the corresponding polynomial equation of different parts of the curve which 
represents the process variable as a function of time. 
An example of particular result and also the conceptual type of results is shown below in Figure 
3.8. 
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Figure 3.8. Example of results generated by the dynamic PSA methodology 
 
IDDA can be considered a methodology that has as fundamental purpose the systematic and 
complete exploration of alternatives that are possible inside the formulated hypotheses [4]. 
The logic-probabilistic model can be interfaced with a phenomenological model of an associated 
system in order to obtain for each alternative sequence the following elements that represent 
the basis for a decision making process: 
 Probability of occurrence of that alternative (i.e. constituent) 
 The physical evolution in time of the particular process variable 
 Class of consequence to which the event is belonging 
 
The analysis of the constituents, in terms of logical congruence and correspondence with the 
knowledge of the plant, is made easier by their representation as concatenations of events that 
are placed along a well defined time trajectory [5]. 
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3.4.1. DYNAMIC PSA approach results 
 
By making use of the thermal–hydraulic model of a CANDU 6 NPP built in RELAP5 Mod.3.3 
code, it has been simulated the total Loss of Feed-Water supply on the secondary side of steam 
generators, transient that in the normal plant operating conditions would require EWS system 
intervention, see plant response at subparagraph 3.3.1.  
 
The RELAP5 model, that simulates the CANDU 6 power plant transient, is supposed to be in 
the following conditions and generates the resulting events sequence: 
 
 Steady state conditions for - 600 s 
 Reactor initially at 103% full power 
 Total LOFW occurs at 0.0 s 
 CLASS III and IV Power not available 
 Reactor trip at 0.87 s 
 PHTS pumps trip 1 s after reactor trip 
 Turbine isolation valves close 2 s after reactor trip 
 MSSV are immediately open by the operator as boiler upper head reaches a pressure 
value equal to 5 MPa; alternatively, MSSV cycles discharge steam for 20 consecutive 
minutes, maintaining the pressure in the range 4.8-5.0 MPa and after that open 
automatically. 
 When SG secondary side pressure reaches 3.5 bar, EWS can supply water. This occurs 
respectively at 552 s and 1493 s after reactor trip, depending on the operator 
intervention or not. 
 In order to see the trends of PHTS temperature and SG downcomer level, the total time 
for which the transients have been simulated is 5000 seconds. 
 
As the goal of the present application is to see what would be the CANDU 6 reactor 
phenomenology (both primary and secondary side circuits) associated to a total loss of main 
feedwater transient concomitant with the unavailability of the emergency short and long water 
supply and along with the specific plant response, the resulted number of important scenarios 
that were simulated by the thermal-hydraulic code were eight. 
 
For simplicity and a better visibility of the scenarios that were analyzed by the thermal hydraulic 
an event tree has been created, see below Figure 3.9. 
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Figure3.9 The main scenarios analyzed within the RELAP5 thermal-hydraulic model 
 
The thermal hydraulic model provides those process variables that along the transient are of 
interest in order to monitor plant evolution, such as SG’s downcomer level, primary heat 
transport system pressure and temperature. 
Through a FORTRAN programming interface the results that are given by RELAP5 code are 
extracted as data sets and, through piece by piecewise polynomial fit or only one polynomial fit, 
are forwarded to IDDA code, that couples the system logic probabilistic model with the thermal-
hydraulic results. The System Process Simulator that has been built in FORTRAN was meant to 
find out the water level (water inventory) inside downcomer of steam generator along with all the 
system possible modes of occurrence of EWS short and long term water supply. One example 
of FORTRAN subroutine (i.e. interface between the logic-probabilistic model and RELAP output 
data) used is given in Annex D.  
 
When EWS is employed, during a transient such as Total Loss of Feed-water, the operator in 
Main Control Room will require process information in order to monitor the status of the station. 
The following indicators are on the EWS control panel: 
 Steam Generator Downcomer Level 
 Heat Transport System Pressure 
 Primary Heat Transport System Coolant Temperature 
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The two process variables that have been considered of special interest for the plant 
phenomenology and assessed were the steam generator down-comer level to see in which 
conditions the steam generator dry-out can be reached and the other parameter considered was 
the PHTS coolant temperature in order to see how much worsen the conditions. 
3.4.2. Thermal-hydraulic results of the simulated transients scenarios 
 
The following figures show the SG Down-comer Level and PHTS coolant temperature, the two 
process variables that are of interest for the plant operator in order to monitor the plant status 
along total LOFW transient in the above mentioned 8 different plant configurations: 
 
Figure 3.10 Scenarios 1 to 8, SG Downcomer Level 
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Figure 3.11 Scenarios 1 to 8, PHTS coolant temperature 
 
3.4.3.FORTRAN programming code interface 
 
The results of thermal-hydraulic analysis that are given by RELAP code are forwarded through a 
FORTRAN subroutine to IDDA code, see Annex D. The FORTRAN interface contains the 
polynomials that fit as much as possible the data sets of process variables of interest for a 
safely plant operation. 
An example of the polynomial equation that fits the given process variable along the transient is 
shown in Figure 3.12, to be compared with Figure 3.10, Scenario 1.  
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Figure 3.12 Trend Curve and Polynomial Fit 
The FORTRAN interface contains the polynomials that fit as much as possible the data sets of 
interested process variables. Therefore, by use of logical operators and flags, the 
phenomenology that characterizes the constituent trajectory in subject is transferred. 
3.4.4. DYNAMIC PSA approach results 
 
The following figures 3.13 and 3.14 below show two snap-shots of the dynamic PSA 
approach.  They are given by the IDDA code after the coupling procedure has been completed, 
and are self explanatory. 
  
These figures show the evolution in time of the steam generator down-comer level and of the 
fuel sheath temperature, as well as the sequences of events that can lead to EWS system 
unavailability either for the short term, or for the long term.  
 
In case of short term unavailability 1751constituents have as phenomenological consequences 
the conditions of scenario S2 and respectively for long term unavailability 805 constituents have 
as phenomenological consequences the conditions of scenario S3. 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 12, EWS short-term failure can lead to SG dry out for more than 
2000 s, but correct operation of long term EWS recovers the situation, bringing the plant in safe 
conditions.  
 
Only total failure of the EWS system can produce dangerous plant conditions in the examined 
time period, as shown in Figure 13: fuel sheath temperatures become greater than nominal 
operating temperatures (scenarios 4 and 8). These sequences could bring to severe accidents 
conditions.  
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Figure 3.13 Trend Curves of SG Downcomer Level  
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Figure 3.14. Trend curves of PHTS Coolant Temperature  
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3.5 Generic CANDU 6 plant response to  a  Station Blackout (SBO) accident 
 
3.5.1 SBO Accident description 
 
The Station Blackout (SBO) accident represents a beyond design basis case3  scenario, a 
consequential condition following an earthquake for instance, which involves the loss of external 
grid, Stand-by Diesel Generators (SDGs) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EPS EDGs), 
therefore loss of all AC electric power generation sources of the plant.  
The plant and operator response following this accident is described below, [1]: 
 The reactor is shutdown immediately after the SBO, either by first shutdown system 
(SDS1) or second shutdown system (SDS2) on the process trip parameters. Both 
shutdown systems are designed to fail safe, in such a manner that if they are not 
supplied with electrical power the systems will perform their design function, i.e. reactor 
shutdown. Therefore the possibility to have an ATWS event as in the classical PWR 
design is discarded; 
 
 The Loss of Class IV power determines the following event sequences: turbine trip, 
reactor trip, main coolant pump trip, main feedwater pump trip, SGs steam pressure 
increase with a consequently opening and closing of the Main Steam Safety Valve 
(MSSVs) for SG overpressure protection; 
 
 The Loss of Class III power determines the loss of the auxiliary feedwater pump; 
 
 In case of SBO the operator should initiate SGs depressurization in order to bring into 
service the low pressure water supply to SGs, i.e. the dousing tank water supply or 
pumped Emergency Water Supply. The operator will open MSSVs and when the SGs 
pressure decrease below 345 kPa, the water from the dousing tank will start to be fed by 
gravity into the SG; 
 
 Considering that the Class I and II electrical power (batteries) are available, in case that 
the operator does not depressurize the SGs then the auto-depressurization is 
automatically initiated when specific conditions are reached. The secondary side SG 
pressure then oscillates at the MSSV set point as the safety valves open and close; 
 
                                                             
3 The beyond  design basis accidents are severe accidents characterized by multiple failures and their accident 
conditions are more severe than a design basis accident. They are normally identified by a systematic plant review 
or by a PSA, and are too low in frequency to merit inclusion in the design basis set. For instance, in CANDU 6 design 
the accidents that result in damage to the reactor core are of two classes, those for which the core geometry is 
preserved called also Limited Core Damage Accidents and those for which the core geometry is lost, called also 
Severe Core Damage Accidents. The Limited Core Damage Accidents are typically considered part of the design 
basis for PHWRs. 
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 In both cases, either manual or auto depressurization of the SGs, the water inventory will 
be available from the dousing tank that is located at the top of containment building; 
 
 Since water is provided to the SGs, the thermo-siphoning process will ensure decay 
power removal and the fuel damage is not expected; 
 
 SG depressurization causes a rapid depressurization of the PHT system and also the 
draining of the pressurizer due to shrinkage. The secondary side water level in SGs 
decreases as boil-off proceeds. The SGs reach the dry-out state and are no longer a 
heat sink to remove the decay heat from the PHTS; 
 
 During this time, the plant operators will attempt to restore the EPS diesel generators in 
order to start EWS pumps that ensure the long-term heat sink. In case that EPS cannot 
be recovered, the plant procedures are directing the operator to use the mobile Diesels 
Generators. Once the mobile Diesel generators are operational, the EWS pumps can be 
used to provide water supply to SGs; 
 
 The moderator temperature in the calandria vessel increases as a result of the loss of 
moderator cooling and heat transfer from the core. 
 
 Containment isolation valves will fail close either on loss of their electrical power supply 
or loss of instrumentation air. Therefore the containment function considering the SBO 
accident is not affected; 
 
 The monitoring of the critical safety parameters will be ensured by use of electrical 
power supplied from batteries (8 hours autonomy). After depletion of the batteries is 
considered that the mobile diesel generators can be connected. 
3.5.2 SBO study assumptions 
 
The study, both the logic-probabilistics model and the thermal-hydraulic model considered the 
following assumptions: 
 AC power and all onsite standby/emergency electric power are unavailable; 
 
 The batteries are credited as available; 
 
 Reactor shutdown is initiated immediately after accident initiation. The possibility of an 
ATWS is not credit for CANDU 6 design; 
 
 Moderator cooling and shield cooling are assumed unavailable; 
 
 Shutdown cooling system is unavailable; 
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 Main and auxiliary feed water are assumed unavailable as a consequence of SBO 
event. The logic-probabilistic and the thermal-hydraulic analysis consider successive 
recovery attempts of the external grid after 1, 2 and 3 hours and recall of the auxiliary 
feedwater system, in case the external grid was successfully recovered; 
 
 The injection flowrate is considered to be the same for AFW and EWS. 
 
 Once the AFW pump is failed, no reparation is credited. 
 
 Emergency Core Coolant System (ECCS), including high (HPI), medium (MPI) and low 
pressure (LPI) injection, are not credited in this analysis; 
 
 Crash cool-down system (i.e. automatic opening of 8 out of 16 MSSVs) is not credited; 
 
 Steam generator safety valves (i.e. MSSVs) are available; they open and close at the set 
point; 
 
 Containment dousing system is initially available, but both the logic-probabilistic analysis 
and thermal-hydraulic analysis consider the possibility of failure of this system. The 
failure could be due to reclosure of the isolation valves that are on the path supply to the 
SGs; 
 
 The main steam isolation valves are closed after accident initiation, therefore the turbine 
is tripped and isolated; 
 
 All operator interventions are credited, excepting the immediate opening of the MSSVs 
following the SBO accident; 
 
 As the thermal-hydraulic model of the generic CANDU 6 plant considers only one loop of 
the reactor, the triggering of the loop isolation is not considered; 
 
 The opening and closure of the Liquid Relief Valves that are meant to protect the 
Calandria Vessel against overpressure are not credited in the analysis; 
 
 In case that the EWS system cannot provide water to SGs, the fire water trucks or the 
possibility to provide water directly to the SGs through the EWS pipes is not credited; 
 
 The mobile diesel generators connection to the EWS pumps is credited to be possible in 
approximately 3 hours; field experiments confirmed that, [1]. 
 
 The calandria vault is not considered. 
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3.5.3. IDDA logic-probabilistics model 
 
According to the plant response in case of SBO accident and specific study assumptions 
presented at the previous paragraphs (see § 3.7.1. and § 3.7.2.) was created the corresponding 
IDDA logic-probabilistics model. The resulted scenarios are 33. The equivalent event tree that 
corresponds to the scenarios generated by IDDA is given at Figure 3.15, below. 
 
Figure 3.15 SBO Even Tree resulted  
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The SBO logic probabilistic input syntax file is given in Annex E and the resulted scenarios are 
given in Annex F. 
If according to the SBO logic-probabilistics the plant response in terms of scenarios were 
resulted 33, then in terms of consequences that can rise within the spectrum of cause-
consequence, the number of scenarios that develop different consequences are 10. 
Table 3.6 given below summarizes the scenarios that have the same consequences or unique 
consequences. 
Reference 
Scenario 
Scenarios with similar consequences as the 
reference scenario or unique consequences 
Scenario summary 
1 NA All the operator actions 
and mitigation systems 
are actuated as it should, 
the plant reaches stable 
conditions. 
2 NA Dousing tank system 
fails, the grid is recovered 
after one hour and the 
recall of AFW pump is 
successful.  
3 Scenario 7, 
Scenario 11, 
Scenario 14. 
All mitigation systems fail, 
even if the external grid 
was successfully 
recovered, but following 
the connection of mobile 
DG to the EWS pump 
connection the water 
injection is possible after 
3 hours from the initiation 
of SBO accident. 
4 Scenario 5 
Scenario 8 
Scenario 9 
Scenario 10 
Scenario 12 
Scenario 13 
Scenario 15 
Scenario 16 
Finally even if the 
external grid recovery 
was possible, then the 
failure comes either from 
the mobile DG or the 
failure of EWS system 
(e.g. fail to start of EWS 
pump) 
6 NA Dousing tank system 
fails, the grid is recovered 
after two hours and the 
recall of AFW pump is 
successful. 
17 NA All the mitigation systems 
are actuated as it should, 
the plant reaches stable 
conditions. 
18 NA MSSVs are cycling for a 
while until the SG 
pressure is decreased. 
Dousing tank system 
fails, the grid is recovered 
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after one hour and the 
recall of AFW pump is 
successful. 
19 Scenario 23 
Scenario 27 
Scenario 30 
MSSVs are cycling for a 
while until the SG 
pressure is decreased. All 
mitigation systems fail, 
even if the external grid 
was successfully 
recovered, but following 
the connection of mobile 
DG to the EWS pump 
connection the water 
injection is possible after 
3 hours from the initiation 
of SBO accident. 
20 Scenario 21 
Scenario 24 
Scenario 25 
Scenario 28 
Scenario 29 
Scenario 31 
Scenario 32 
MSSVs are cycling for a 
while until the SG 
pressure is decreased. 
Finally even if the 
external grid recovery 
was possible, then the 
failure comes either from 
the mobile DG or the 
failure of EWS system 
(e.g. fail to start of EWS 
pump) 
22 NA MSSVs are cycling for a 
while until the SG 
pressure is decreased. 
Dousing tank system 
fails, the grid is recovered 
after two hours and the 
recall of AFW pump is 
successful. 
 
Table 3.6 SBO scenarios with unique consequences or similar consequences 
3.5.4. SBO transient thermal-hydraulic results 
 
The same as for the first application of Chapter 3, the scenarios split in those that are 
considering the intervention of the operator from main control room that opens the MSSVs in 
order to depressurize the steam generators and scenarios that are considering the MSSVs 
cycling until the pressure is decreased to the set point of actuation of the dousing tank, therefore 
the timing is different. As it has been shown above in Table 3.8, the scenarios with unique 
consequences are 8. 
In the following we present the thermal hydraulic results obtained for the different scenarios. 
The process variables that are of special interest for plant monitoring are the following: 
 SG downcomer level 
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 PHTS coolant temperature 
 Fuel sheath temperature  
The following figures describe the SBO scenarios: the first four scenarios (i.e. S2, S3, S4 and 
S6) that are considering the successful MCR operator action to open the MSSVs and the last 
four scenarios (i.e. S18, S19, S20, S22) that do not credit the operator action and consider the 
MSSV cycling until MSSVs get depressurized at the set point of dousing tank gravitational 
feeding.  
 
Figure 3.16 SBO Event Tree - Scenario 2 – External grid recovery after one hour and then 
successful AFW running 
 
Figure 3.17 SBO Event Tree - Scenario 3 – No recovery of the external grid, but successful 
connection of MDGs after 3 hours and then running of one out of two EWS pumps  
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Figure 3.18 SBO Event Tree - Scenario 4 – Neither successful recovery of the external grid, nor 
successful running of EWS pumps after 3 hours 
 
Figure 3.19 SBO Event Tree - Scenario 6 – Successful recovery of the external grid after 2 
hours, and then successful running of AFW pump  
The Figure 3.20 presents the actuation of AFW or EWS after 1, 2 or 3 hours occurrence of the 
SBO, 
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Figure 3.20 AFW (EWS) flowrate –operator actuates MSSVs 
Figure 3.21 shows the SG downcomer level recovery or non recovery and the time when the 
SGs reach the dry-out conditions or complete refill. 
 
Figure 3.21 SG downcomer level - operator actuates MSSVs 
 
The Figure 3.22 shows the fuel sheath temperature variations following the 4 scenarios with 
unique consequence that might occur considering that operator from MCR successfully actuates 
the MSSVs in order to depressurize the SGs. It is shown that in case the heat sink is missing 
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(see scenario 4) the temperature increases but not drastically, the moderator present in 
calandria vessel act as a ultimate heat and cut the eventual temperature rise. 
 
Figure 3.22 Fuel sheath temperature – operator actuates MSSVs 
The Figure 3.23 shows the different trends that PHTS coolant temperature can take for the first 
four scenarios. The PHTS coolant temperature could have a small temperature increase due to 
delays in providing heat sink for 1, 2 or 3 hours (see scenarios S2, S6, S3) but however in case 
the heat sink is missing (i.e. SG water inventory) then moderator that surrounds the fuel 
channels acts as a ultimate heat sink, due to its low temperature, i.e. 343 K. 
 
Figure 3.23 PHTS coolant (D2O) temperature – MSSVs operator action 
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The following figures present the other 4 scenarios of SBO event tree with unique 
consequences. These scenarios do not credit the operator action from MCR that actuates the 
opening of MSSVs, those latter are cycling and depressurize the SGs with a delay of 
approximately 1100 seconds. 
 
Figure 3.24 SBO Event Tree - Scenario 18 – External grid recovery after one hour and then 
successful AFW running 
 
Figure 3.25 SBO Event Tree - Scenario 19 – No recovery of the external grid, but successful 
connection of MDGs after 3 hours and then successful running of one out two EWS pumps  
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Figure 3.26 SBO Event Tree - Scenario 20 – Neither recovery of the external grid, nor 
successful running of one of the EWS pumps after 3 hours 
 
 
 
Figure 3.27 SBO Event Tree - Scenario 22 – Neither recovery of the external grid, nor 
successful running of EWS pumps after 3 hours 
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The Figure 3.28 presents the actuation of AFW (EWS) after 1, 2 or 3 hours occurrence of the 
SBO. It can be seen that the SGs depressurization occur later (approximately 1100 seconds) 
due to the low rate depressurization of MSSVs. 
 
Figure 3.28 AFW (EWS) flowrate – MSSVs cycling 
Figure 3.29 shows the SG downcomer level recovery or non recovery and the time needed for 
the SGs to reach the dry-out conditions. It can be seen that the SG dryout conditions are 
reached with some delay, approximately 20 minutes later. 
 
Figure 3.29 SG downcomer level – MSSVs cycling 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000
Fl
ow
ra
te
 [k
g/
s]
Time (s)
AFW (EWS) FLOWRATE AFTER 1, 2, 3 HOUR(S) 
AFTER IE
AFW1 - S18
AFW2 - S18
AFW1 - S22
AFW2 - S22
EWS1 - S19
EWS2 - S19
EWS1 -no flow- S20
EWS2 -no flow- S20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000
Le
ve
l [
m
]
Time [s]
Steam Generator level
SG1 - S18
SG2 - S18
SG1 - S22
SG2 - S22
SG1 - S19
SG2 - S19
SG1 - S20
SG2 - S20
88 
 
Figure 3.30 shows the fuel sheath temperature, it is confirmed that the fast actuation (opening) 
by operator of the MSSVs induces a crash cooldown for the primary temperature and pressure 
and then the eventual lack of heat sink induces some temperature increases. On the contrary 
for the case when MSSVs are cycled until the SGs are depressurized, the temperatures have 
small increases in case of lack of heat sinks, but then the fact that the moderator is at low 
temperature and pressure makes the moderator to act as a successfully ultimate heat sink. 
 
Figure 3.30 Fuel sheath temperature – MSSVs cycling 
The Figure 3.31 shows the PHTS coolant (D2O) temperature variations along with the possible 
scenarios that might occur. It is shown that in case the heat sink is missing, then the 
temperature increases but not drastically, the moderator present in calandria vessel act as a 
ultimate heat and cuts successfully the eventual temperature rise.  
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Figure 3.31 PHTS coolant (D2O) temperature – MSSVs cycling 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
The potential and interest of the present approach in comparison with the classical PSA 
approach is given by the methodology itself that uses the dynamic Event-Decision Trees. This 
allows raising sequences of possible events related in cause-consequence reasoning, each one 
giving place to a scenario with its development and its consequences. The latter is valid when 
very complex interactions take place between software-hardware and operator actions. So we 
can acquire the knowledge not only of which sequences of events are taking place, but also of 
the real environment in which they are taking place. 
 
Coupling the two different outputs (e.g. deterministic and logic-probabilistic) it can be obtained a 
full representation of the system operational states, as well as all the possible occurring patterns 
that are expressed in a set of mutually self excluding sequences. Availability of the full set of 
alternatives allows the complete spectrum of probability-consequence conditions to be used as 
a basis of decision making process in order to mitigate and control risk with measures such as 
up-graded plant operating procedures, adding redundancy of protective equipment, and adding 
front line systems, and so on. 
The possibility to interface the logic probabilistic model of a system with a process simulator 
allows the assessment of the status of each relevant process variable with reference to the 
failure sequence identified. In addition, this permits the mutual interactions of the hardware 
components and the physical evolution of the plant to be taken into account [6]. 
 
Further the methodology proposed makes possible revealing situations where the correct 
intervention of protective equipment or operator actions could bring even to unexpected events. 
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In particular, the present Dynamic PSA approach might be very useful in support of power plant 
safety improvements, either in plant hardware or in operating procedures. 
No specific results have been yield following the first application due to lack of consistent and 
detailed input data in regard to system operation and configuration. The thermal-hydraulic 
model of the CANDU 6 reactor design and the associated transient phenomenology has been 
well reflected and consequently the results confirmed and stressed the importance of 
emergency water supply in both short and long term. However, it should be taken into account 
that very conservative assumptions have been considered for the thermal-hydraulic model of 
the CANDU6 design and a further reconsideration of them would give generous increase of the 
safety margins and grace periods observed along the calculations. 
 
The results of the second application show that significant time is available for operator action 
during the Station Blackout accident to arrest the accident progression.  
Experiments showed that significant sag of the CANDU fuel channel driven by creep occurs 
above 800 C degrees, following the accident scenarios that were analyzed; any of them did not 
reached those temperatures. Since creep deformation is a slow process, the core damage 
progression in a CANDU 6 core is expected to be a slow process. 
Furthermore the progression of a severe core damage accident within the CANDU 6 calandria 
vessel could be analyzed by use of MELCOR or MAAP4 CANDU code, the latter contains 
CANDU-specific models, such as horizontal fuel channels within the core, calandria vessel and 
calandria vault. 
The second application confirmed the importance of the moderator and its parameters, i.e. 
temperature 343 K and pressure of 1 bar, therefore the cold mass inventory of moderator 
serves as an important heat sink which can avoid or cut eventually temperature increases. 
Assuming even total failure of active heat sinks, the moderator inventory of water dramatically 
slows down the progression of the accident, allowing time for recovery actions to be taken by 
operators and time for emergency planning. 
It is confirmed that the moderator can preserve the fuel channel integrity and prevent gross 
melting of the UO2 for short and long term severe accident sequences, such as an SBO. In 
addition, the presence of the shield water around the calandria, (i.e. reactor vault), enables the 
calandria shell to be cooled and thereby serve for many hours as a core catcher in severe 
accident scenarios. 
The onset of PHTS reaching saturation conditions and furthermore boil off is expected after 
many hours from the start of the event, [1]. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 presents future possible applications that could be developed with the present 
approach. The application objective could be the optimization of the emergency operating 
procedures (EOPs) in terms of operator grace windows and not only. The same as the previous 
applications presented in chapter 3, the approach consists in coupling the logic-probabilistics of 
the plant configurations corresponding to the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and the 
associated phenomenology of the primary heat transport systems with the consideration of the 
plant safety systems.  
Emergency operating procedures (EOPs) are essential for maintaining the fundamental safety 
functions and for preventing core damage during both design basis accidents and beyond 
design basis accidents in nuclear power plants (NPPs), [1]. Emergency  operating  procedures  
(EOPs)  in nuclear  plants  guide  operators  in handling  significant  process  disturbances. In 
EOPs operators are required to simply follow the procedures without diagnosing the cause of 
the emergency situations. This means that the quality of EOPs is one of the most decisive 
factors in determining the safety of the plant. 
The development of such an application could highlight those situations where the plant fails 
either because of hardware failures or system dynamics and reveal those situations where 
changing of the hardware states brings the process variables of the system state out of the 
system domain. 
A timeline course needs to be created for the most important process variables characterizing 
the plant state. The timeline course could reveal the time windows that operators have at 
disposition for intervention, in order to avoid potentially catastrophic conditions.  
The IDDA methodology can be utilized to identify how certain postulated top events may occur 
in a given system. The result is a set of prime implicants that represent system faults resulting 
from diverse combinations of possible system parameter, operator error and/or component 
state. 
The associated plant phenomenology could be obtained from the usual deterministic codes 
employed in deterministic safety analysis. The code should be linked to IDDA in order to 
determine the evolution of each generated scenario. 
4.2 The approach description 
 
The approach itself provides in general the framework of the integrated safety analysis. 
According to reference [2], the integrated safety analysis should provide: 
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 a description of the structures, equipment, and process active at the facility/installation, 
 an identification  and systematic  analysis of hazards at the facility 
 a comprehensive  identification  of potential accident/event  sequences  that would result 
in unacceptable  consequences,  and the expected  likelihoods  of those sequences, 
 an identification  and description  of controls (i.e., structures, systems,  equipment,  or 
components)  that are relied on to limit or prevent potential  accidents  or mitigate their 
consequences,   
 an identification  of measures taken to ensure the availability  and reliability  of identified 
safety systems. 
Although these techniques were established primarily as tools to analyze process hazards at 
chemical facilities, they were extended to address radiological and nuclear criticality hazards. 
Finally the major objectives of the approach are to find the dangerous scenarios in the plant 
event space, estimating their probability of occurrence. 
The approach is briefly described in the following sub-chapters. 
4.2.1 The Emergency Operating Procedure scenarios delineation 
 
A tree structured simulation of the EOP scenarios is realized through the use of IDDA code in 
order to build up the event tree associated to the chosen emergency operating procedure. The 
number of scenarios generated within the EOP could rise in function of the complexity of 
transient to tens of thousands. However, applying a cutoff probability (e.g. 1.E-12 cut-off 
probability used in the classical PSA scenarios truncation) to the scenarios generated within the 
EOP, then the number of scenarios is reduced to a manageable number that the approach can 
be easily handled; furthermore this reduces significantly the computational efforts enabling the 
identification of rare, but potentially high consequence hazards. 
The deterministic analysis should provide the trend of the most important process variables that 
have significant impact on the plant safety and then the parameters evolution is shown in 
function of time along with the different scenarios that occur for the given plant transient. 
The following, Figure 4.1  simply sketches the approach intended for the optimization of the 
emergency operating procedures. 
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Figure 4.1 Dynamic PSA approach simple sketch 
Through the use of IDDA code, the approach follows the traditional PSA techniques for problem 
decomposition, i.e. event tree, keeping the same overall structure and calculating the same type 
of results – scenario end state probability of occurrence. 
4.2.2 Critical plant safety parameters 
 
Following the deterministic analysis results, for each plant critical safety parameter chosen by 
the analyst, then the scenarios that are leading to plant/facility failure are identified; moreover 
the thermal hydraulic model associated confirms that the process variable is over its safety limit 
and within the failure domain. The correct timing in the successful activation of safety mitigation 
systems can ensure that the violation of plant safety margins is avoided. Also, the approach 
confirms that the interaction of physical processes and operator actions in time for the 
successful activation of the mitigation systems is crucial for plant safety. 
The Figure 4.2  sketches what has been described previously. 
 
Figure 4.2 Critical safety parameter vs. plant scenario space 
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4.3 Conclusions 
 
The proposed approach identifies the undesirable events or accidents with high or intermediate 
consequences and develops the needed safety measures to prevent or exclude the occurrence 
of such events.  
The IDDA methodology could be utilized to identify how certain postulated top events may occur 
in a given system. The result is a set of prime implicants that represent system faults resulting 
from diverse combinations of possible system parameter, operator error and/or component 
state. 
One of the results of the approach proposed is the identification of controls, both engineered 
and administrative, that are needed to limit or prevent accidents or mitigate their effects.  
Application of methodology requires complete and consistent supporting analyses and data as 
well as a system model describing the system behavior under normal and upset conditions (e.g. 
process simulator). The high complexity of these modules makes that only experimental 
versions have been developed so far. 
Once the dynamic PSA application provides some valuable insights on the system and process 
in subject, those further can be integrated and supplementary given to the Event Tree model. 
The results obtained could either complement the existing information; either to supplement the 
initial ET model. 
Following the Fukushima events it appeared imperious the necessity for plant operators to 
develop new emergency operating procedures for response to Station Blackout and to total and 
extended loss of the spent fuel pool cooling system events. The application of the approach 
described in present chapter could help in improving and strengthening the development of the 
new emergency operating procedures since their very early phase. Using dynamic PSA 
approach the nuclear facilities and industrial installations can achieve and demonstrate safety in 
an effective and efficient manner.    
The chemical industry has performed a number of dynamic/integrated safety analyses on 
process facilities, but because these studies contain proprietary information, few have been 
published or only cited in the open existing literature. 
However the developments that could be carried out in the direction of the present work would 
be to consider the creation of an automatic tool in the way that IDDA commands RELAP5 
scenarios to be analyzed and other way around.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The present work was intended to be an attempt in approaching Dynamic PSA. As the chapter 1 
has shown there were many attempts and many methodologies proved to bring to some extents 
to the development of dynamic PSA. Even if its development commenced many years ago, 
beginning of 80ies, the applications and the applicability remained at the level of R&D, without 
any particular industrial application, so far. 
The currently methodology employed for approaching the dynamic PSA did the use of codes 
coupling such as RELAP5 and IDDA. The application environment had considered the generic 
CANDU 6 plant design, in particular the PHTS response in case of plant specific accidents. 
The applications proposed in the present work have shown the potentiality of tools involved and 
of such an approach and due to the lack of official data input in regard to the system/plant 
configuration and operation did not yield relevant results in terms of CANDU 6 design, but did 
confirmed the robustness of the plant in facing a beyond design basis accident, such as a 
Station Blackout. 
The methodology proposed is not intended to replace the classical PSA method, but to 
complement it when is needed, for instance when too much conservative assumptions are 
involved. The classical PSAs models considered for the current operating nuclear power plants 
involve the different power operational states that need to be considered, i.e. at power and low 
power shutdown conditions. Often the plant power operational states should be split in order to 
consider the different plant configurations and/or plant conditions (e.g. the case of uncontrolled 
level drop with RPV head off and head on for PWR design), but the common PSA practice is to 
consider the configuration with the worse consequences. In this manner the intended scope of 
PSA to be a best estimate tool is not anymore preserved and introduces additional 
conservativeness. Following the coupling between the deterministic and probabilistic analysis 
could be identified those sleeping threats that usually stay in the residual risk, and could 
address the uncertainty that the analyst has it present, and in particular if the accident scenarios 
are the ones right addressed and what is the risk in using bounding conservative accident 
assumptions. In fact, the well known limitations of the classical PSA methodology could be used 
as useful case studies for the Dynamic PSA such as the modeling of logical loops. 
So far, due to the fact that the collaboration  between the plant operators and parties involved in 
the R&D dedicated to this topic is rather laking,  the identification of risk-significant accident 
situations is not obtainable by the traditional approaches (e.g. DSA, PSA). 
The applications developed and the future developments, in case data is made available, proofs 
the fact that the set of codes that constitutes IDDA analysis methodology is a very articulate 
system that has the right answers to almost all analysis requests and needs.  
Also it should be mentioned that the current methodology has been designed for complex 
situations, such as hardware/software and operator actions, and actually in those the code 
shows its real potentialities. The types of results that could be provided in the conditions of valid 
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input data could have a great importance to orient the course of the analysis or to be considered 
as valuable inputs for the decision making process. But still, the present applications have 
proved only partly the potentialities of the IDDA code, mainly the most important features, and 
there are still features that were not presented due to the lack of space and scope of the 
applications of the current work. 
The first application has shown that the same type of results in terms of system unavailability 
could be obtained by making use of IDDA code and not of the classical Fault Trees analysis. 
Moreover in the same application, has been shown the potentiality that IDDA code has in 
considering the possibility of risk analysis. The fact that different types of consequences could 
be associated to the random levels (i.e. basic events) could be a very valuable input for decision 
making situations when requested, as is the case of long term accident scenarios, plant outage 
periods, improvement of plant technical specifications in terms of Allowed Outage Times or/and 
Surveillance In service Testing, and so on. 
The second and third applications have shown that the coupling between the deterministic and 
probabilistic models allowed raising sequences of possible events related in cause-
consequence reasoning, with each one giving place to a scenario with its development and its 
consequences. Therefore to have the possibility to acquire the knowledge not only of which 
sequences of events are taking place, but also of the real environment in which they are taking 
place. 
Hence, coupling the two different results it can be obtained the full representation of the system 
operational states, as well as all the possible occurring patterns that are expressed in a set of 
mutually self excluding sequences, that further allows the complete spectrum of probability-
consequence conditions to be used as a basis of decision making process in order to mitigate 
and control risk with measures such as addition of redundancy on the protective equipment/ 
front line systems, up-graded plant operating procedures, improvement treatment of the 
operator actions and so on. 
The possibility to interface the logic probabilistic model of a system with a process simulator 
allows the assessment of the status of each relevant process variable with reference to the 
failure sequence identified. In addition, this permits the mutual interactions of the hardware 
components and the physical evolution of the plant to be taken into account. 
 
The application presented in chapter 4 as future development for the optimization of the plant 
EOPs could addresses the plant scenario space with time dependent events and plant state 
parameters, therefore addressing a more realistic structure of EOP and/or event trees.  
 
The complementarities that exist between the deterministic and probabilistic analysis, i.e. the 
fact that the DSA identifies the safety margins but the accident sequences analyzed are only 
few and then the fact that PSA does not provide any information about safety margins, but 
considers the spectrum of many accident scenarios makes the development of Dynamic PSA 
necessary and needed in order to provide exhaustiveness in regards to the safety analysis of 
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the plant. Furthermore the consideration of such an approach gives the right frame of risk 
informed safety margins. 
 
All the enumerated advantages could surely improve the plant emergency preparedness, give a 
more effective risk-informed regulation and an increased robustness of safety assessment. 
 
However so far the present developments in the direction of dynamic PSA proved the high 
complexity of the models and not yet applied for industrial purposes, that currently only 
experimental versions have been developed. The best progress of the issue has been 
registered by the Spanish nuclear safety authority, CSN, that involved the participation of 
universities, research institutes and has started the work in the beginning of 80ies. The purpose 
of CSN was to develop an independent safety analysis review tool, such as DPSA that mainly 
delineates the ETs submitted in the frame of Spanish PSA studies. 
Along with the many challenges that the dynamic PSA has to face in order to become applicable 
and worth considering it, the main question that remains still open for the industry is actually the 
cost-efficiency of considering the application or non-application of such methodologies for 
industrial purposes. 
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ANNEX A  
 
:Start of analysis -Total Loss of Feed-water (2 main pumps + 1 auxiliary pump) 
1   1.  0.  0   2   3    'IE'  'dnOccur'   'Occurs' 
:Miscalibration error of the SG pressure detectors 
;as the miscalibration error has higher failure rate than the sensor failure rate, the latter is not 
considered 
2  3.E-02   0.795   3   15   3   'Pre.Sens'   'Calibr.'  'Mis.Calb' 
: Main Steam Safety Valves open sure, there is no doubt, therefore no failure rate is assigned 
3   0.   0.  4   4    3   'MSSVs'    'Success'   'Failure' 
: Pressure on the secondary side of SG is below 3.45 bar 
4   0.  0.   5   5   3   '3.45bar'   'Success'  'Failure' 
:Dousing Tank fails - External large leak 
5  9.43E-07   0.720  6  80   3  'DTank'  'No Leak'  'Leaks' 
24  8  0.  0. 
:PV41 fails to open, because the transient occurs during maintainance period of PV41 
6  1.E-06  0.795   7  80  3  'PV41MNT'  'No.MNTC'   'MNTC' 
:SV41 fails to open  
7  5.E-3   0.720   8  80  3  'SV41'  'Works'  'dnWork' 
:PV41 properly failure to open 
8  1.11E-03  0.466   9  80  3  'PV41PF'  'Open'  'dnOpen' 
;*********************************Water supply************************************** 
:PV7 fails to open, because the transient occurs during maintainance period of PV7 
9  1.E-6  0.795  10  901  3   'PV7MNT'  'No.MNTC'   'MNTC' 
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:SV7 fails to open  
10  5.E-3   0.720   11  17  3  'SV7'  'Works'  'dnWork' 
:PV7 properly failure to open 
11  1.11E-03  0.466   12  901  3  'PV7PF'  'Open'  'dnOpen' 
16  8  0.  0. 
:CV49 failure to open 
12  1.3E-05  0.720  100  901  3  'CV49.O'  'Open'  'dnOpen' 
;*********************************PV41/7 Actuation **************************** 
;operator action that actuates PV41 from MCR, therefore has to use the HS41 
;is it assumed that he receives all necessary inputs, alarms 
:Operator error to actuates PV41 HS41 from MCR 
15  1.E-02  0.795  16  80  3   'HS41.HE'   'Success'   'Failure'  
:HS41 does it work 
16  1.E-04  0.520  8   80  3  'HS41'  'Works'  'DnWorks' 
:Operator error to actuates the PV7 HS7 from MCR 
17  1.E-03  0.795  18  901  3  'HS7.HE'  'Success'   'Failure' 
:HS7 does it work 
18  1.E-04  0.520  11  901  3  'HS7'  'Works'  'DnWorks' 
;******************************EWS Pumped******************************************* 
: Field operator starts 1/2 EWS pumps 
80  6.E-03  0.795  90  901  3  'EWSPs.HE'  'Success'   'Failure' 
:P1 fails to start due to maintainance period 
90  1.E-06  0.520  105  260  3  'P1.MNTC'  'No.MNTC'  'MNTC' 
:P1 failure to start due to CCF 
105  8.E-05  0.520   110  260   3  'P1Fs.CCF'  'No.CCF'  'CCF' 
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24   260  0.  0. 
:P1 failure to start  
110  2.23E-03  0.497   120   260  3  'P1Fst'  'Start'  'dnStart' 
24  150  0.  0. 
24  160  0.  0. 
15  260  0.  0. 
:P1 failure to run due to CCF 
120  8.4E-05  0.520   130  260  3  'P1Fr.CCF'  'No.CCF'  'CCF' 
24   280  0.  0. 
:P1 failure to run 
130  1.0E-04  0.375  140  260  3   'P1Frun'  'Run'  'dnRun' 
15   280  0.  0. 
:V9V11 CCF failure to open  
140  2.47E-06  0.520  150  260  3  'V9V11CCF'  'No.CCF'  'CCF' 
:CV9 fails to open 
150  1.3E-05  0.720  160  260  3  'CV9.O'  'Open'  'dnOpen' 
15   300  0.  0. 
:V10  fails to open 
160  2.5E-03  0.795  170  260  3   'SV10.O'  'Open'  'dnOpen' 
:V45 failure to close 
170  7.0E-05  0.720   180  190  3  'V45.C'  'Close'  'dnClose' 
:V44 failure to open 
180  1.30E-05  0.720   11  901  3  'V44.O'  'Open'  'dnOpen' 
:V47 failure to close 
190  7.0E-05  0.720   180  901  3  'V47.C'  'Close'  'dnClose' 
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:P2 failure to start due to CCF 
260  8.0E-05  0.520  270   901   3  'P2Fs.CCF'  'No.CCF'  'CCF' 
:P2 properly failure to start  
270  1.9E-2  0.497   280  901   3  'P2Fst'  'Start'  'dnStart' 
24   310  0.  0. 
24   320  0.  0. 
:P2 failure to run due to CCF 
280  8.4E-05  0.520   290  901   3  'P2Fr.CCF'  'No.CCF'  'CCF' 
:P2  failure to run 
290  1.08E-04  0.375   300  901    3   'P2Frun'  'Run'  'dnRun' 
:CCF to open of both V9V11  
300  2.47E-06  0.520   310  901  3  'V11V9CCF'  'No.CCF'  'CCF' 
:V11 failure to open  
310  1.30E-05  0.720   320  901  3  'CV11.O'  'Open'  'dnOpen' 
:V12 failure to open 
320  2.5E-03  0.795   170  901  3  'SV12.O'  'Open'  'dnOpen' 
;***********************************END STATES************************************** 
:EWS  Failure 
901  1.  0.  0   0   3  'EWS'  '  '  'Failure' 
:EWS  Success 
100  0.  0.  0   0   3  'EWS'  'Success'  '  ' 
;*******************************END of INPUT****************************************** 
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ANNEX B 
 
   FILE NAME : proba2.INP       STARTING LEVEL   :   1  
   1 Start of analysis -Total Loss of Feed-water (2 main pumps + 1 aux 
      [IE          ]   [dnOccur     ]   [Occurs      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Statement    :  [Occurs  !] 
     If [dnOccur ] Then  End                    
     If [Occurs  ] Then Following Event is :   2  [Pre.Sens]-[Calibr. ]-[Mis.Calb] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
   2 Miscalibration error of the SG pressure detectors                 
      [Pre.Sens    ]   [Calibr.     ]   [Mis.Calb    ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Calibr. ?]  or  [Mis.Calb?] 
     If [Calibr. ] Then Following Event is :   3  [MSSVs   ]-[Success ]-[Failure ] 
     If [Mis.Calb] Then Following Event is :  15  [HS41.HE ]-[Success ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
   3  Main Steam Safety Valves open sure, there is no doubt, therefore 
      [MSSVs       ]   [Success     ]   [Failure     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Statement    :  [Success !] 
     If [Success ] Then Following Event is :   4  [3.45bar ]-[Success ]-[Failure ] 
     If [Failure ] Then Following Event is :   4  [3.45bar ]-[Success ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
   4  Pressure on the secondary side of SG is below 3.45 bar           
      [3.45bar     ]   [Success     ]   [Failure     ] 
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     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Statement    :  [Success !] 
     If [Success ] Then Following Event is :   5  [DTank   ]-[No Leak ]-[Leaks   ] 
     If [Failure ] Then Following Event is :   5  [DTank   ]-[No Leak ]-[Leaks   ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
   5 Dousing Tank fails - External large leak                          
      [DTank       ]   [No Leak     ]   [Leaks       ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [No Leak ?]  or  [Leaks   ?] 
     If [No Leak ] Then Following Event is :   6  [PV41MNT ]-[No.MNTC ]-[MNTC    ] 
     If [Leaks   ] Then Following Event is :  80  [EWSPs.HE]-[Success ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     If [Leaks   ] Then it forces EVENT    8 on: ([PV.41.PF]-[dnOpen  ]) 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
   6 PV41 fails to open, because the transient occurs during maintaina 
      [PV41MNT     ]   [No.MNTC     ]   [MNTC        ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [No.MNTC ?]  or  [MNTC    ?] 
     If [No.MNTC ] Then Following Event is :   7  [SV.41   ]-[Works   ]-[dnWork  ] 
     If [MNTC    ] Then Following Event is :  81  [SV.141  ]-[Works   ]-[dnWork  ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
   7 SV41 fails to open                                                
      [SV.41       ]   [Works       ]   [dnWork      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Works   ?]  or  [dnWork  ?] 
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     If [Works   ] Then Following Event is :   8  [PV.41.PF]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [dnWork  ] Then Following Event is :  81  [SV.141  ]-[Works   ]-[dnWork  ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
   8 PV41  failure to open                                             
      [PV.41.PF    ]   [Open        ]   [dnOpen      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Open    ?]  or  [dnOpen  ?] 
     If [Open    ] Then Following Event is :   9  [PV7.MNT ]-[No.MNTC ]-[MNTC    ] 
     If [dnOpen  ] Then Following Event is :  81  [SV.141  ]-[Works   ]-[dnWork  ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  81 SV141 fails to open                                               
      [SV.141      ]   [Works       ]   [dnWork      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Works   ?]  or  [dnWork  ?] 
     If [Works   ] Then Following Event is :  82  [PV141.PF]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [dnWork  ] Then Following Event is :  80  [EWSPs.HE]-[Success ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  82 PV141 failure to open                                             
      [PV141.PF    ]   [Open        ]   [dnOpen      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Open    ?]  or  [dnOpen  ?] 
     If [Open    ] Then Following Event is :   9  [PV7.MNT ]-[No.MNTC ]-[MNTC    ] 
     If [dnOpen  ] Then Following Event is :  80  [EWSPs.HE]-[Success ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
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   9 Event                                                             
      [PV7.MNT     ]   [No.MNTC     ]   [MNTC        ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [No.MNTC ?]  or  [MNTC    ?] 
     If [No.MNTC ] Then Following Event is :  10  [SV.7    ]-[Works   ]-[dnWork  ] 
     If [MNTC    ] Then Following Event is :  58  [SV107   ]-[Works   ]-[dnWork  ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  10 SV7 fails to open                                                 
      [SV.7        ]   [Works       ]   [dnWork      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Works   ?]  or  [dnWork  ?] 
     If [Works   ] Then Following Event is :  11  [PV.7.PF ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [dnWork  ] Then Following Event is :  58  [SV107   ]-[Works   ]-[dnWork  ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  11 PV7 properly failure to open                                      
      [PV.7.PF     ]   [Open        ]   [dnOpen      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Open    ?]  or  [dnOpen  ?] 
     If [Open    ] Then Following Event is :  12  [CV49.O  ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [dnOpen  ] Then Following Event is :  58  [SV107   ]-[Works   ]-[dnWork  ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     If [Open    ] Then it forces EVENT    8 on: ([PV.41.PF]-[dnOpen  ]) 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  58 SV107 fails to open                                               
      [SV107       ]   [Works       ]   [dnWork      ] 
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     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Works   ?]  or  [dnWork  ?] 
     If [Works   ] Then Following Event is :  59  [PV107PF ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [dnWork  ] Then Following Event is :  17  [HS7.HE  ]-[Success ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  59 PV107 properly failure to open                                    
      [PV107PF     ]   [Open        ]   [dnOpen      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Open    ?]  or  [dnOpen  ?] 
     If [Open    ] Then Following Event is :  12  [CV49.O  ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [dnOpen  ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  12 CV49 failure to open                                              
      [CV49.O      ]   [Open        ]   [dnOpen      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Open    ?]  or  [dnOpen  ?] 
     If [Open    ] Then Following Event is : 100  [EWS     ]-[Success ]-[        ] 
     If [dnOpen  ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  15 Operator error to actuates PV41 HS41/141 from MCR                 
      [HS41.HE     ]   [Success     ]   [Failure     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Success ?]  or  [Failure ?] 
     If [Success ] Then Following Event is :  16  [HS41    ]-[Works   ]-[DnWorks ] 
     If [Failure ] Then Following Event is :  80  [EWSPs.HE]-[Success ]-[Failure ] 
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     ------------------------------------------------- 
  16 HS41/141 does it work                                             
      [HS41        ]   [Works       ]   [DnWorks     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Works   ?]  or  [DnWorks ?] 
     If [Works   ] Then Following Event is :   8  [PV.41.PF]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [DnWorks ] Then Following Event is :  80  [EWSPs.HE]-[Success ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  17 Operator error to actuates the PV7 HS7/107 from MCR               
      [HS7.HE      ]   [Success     ]   [Failure     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Success ?]  or  [Failure ?] 
     If [Success ] Then Following Event is :  18  [HS7     ]-[Works   ]-[DnWorks ] 
     If [Failure ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  18 HS7/107 does it work                                              
      [HS7         ]   [Works       ]   [DnWorks     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Works   ?]  or  [DnWorks ?] 
     If [Works   ] Then Following Event is :  59  [PV107PF ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [DnWorks ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  80  Field operator starts 1/2 EWS pumps                              
      [EWSPs.HE    ]   [Success     ]   [Failure     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
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     Question     :  [Success ?]  or  [Failure ?] 
     If [Success ] Then Following Event is :  90  [P1.MNTC ]-[No.MNTC ]-[MNTC    ] 
     If [Failure ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
  90 P1 fails to start due to maintainance period                      
      [P1.MNTC     ]   [No.MNTC     ]   [MNTC        ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [No.MNTC ?]  or  [MNTC    ?] 
     If [No.MNTC ] Then Following Event is : 105  [P1Fs.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     If [MNTC    ] Then Following Event is : 260  [P2Fs.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 105 P1 failure to start due to CCF                                    
      [P1Fs.CCF    ]   [No.CCF      ]   [CCF         ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [No.CCF  ?]  or  [CCF     ?] 
     If [No.CCF  ] Then Following Event is : 110  [P1Fst   ]-[Start   ]-[dnStart ] 
     If [CCF     ] Then Following Event is : 260  [P2Fs.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     If [CCF     ] Then it forces EVENT  260 on: ([P2Fs.CCF]-[CCF     ]) 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 110 P1 failure to start                                               
      [P1Fst       ]   [Start       ]   [dnStart     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Start   ?]  or  [dnStart ?] 
     If [Start   ] Then Following Event is : 120  [P1Fr.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
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     If [dnStart ] Then Following Event is : 260  [P2Fs.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     If [dnStart ] Then it forces EVENT  150 on: ([CV9.O   ]-[dnOpen  ]) 
     If [dnStart ] Then it forces EVENT  160 on: ([SV10.O  ]-[dnOpen  ]) 
     If [Start   ] Then it forces EVENT  260 on: ([P2Fs.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]) 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 120 P1 failure to run due to CCF                                      
      [P1Fr.CCF    ]   [No.CCF      ]   [CCF         ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [No.CCF  ?]  or  [CCF     ?] 
     If [No.CCF  ] Then Following Event is : 130  [P1Frun  ]-[Run     ]-[dnRun   ] 
     If [CCF     ] Then Following Event is : 260  [P2Fs.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     If [CCF     ] Then it forces EVENT  280 on: ([P2Fr.CCF]-[CCF     ]) 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 130 P1 failure to run                                                 
      [P1Frun      ]   [Run         ]   [dnRun       ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Run     ?]  or  [dnRun   ?] 
     If [Run     ] Then Following Event is : 140  [V9V11CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     If [dnRun   ] Then Following Event is : 260  [P2Fs.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     If [Run     ] Then it forces EVENT  280 on: ([P2Fr.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]) 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
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 140 V9V11 CCF failure to open                                         
      [V9V11CCF    ]   [No.CCF      ]   [CCF         ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [No.CCF  ?]  or  [CCF     ?] 
     If [No.CCF  ] Then Following Event is : 150  [CV9.O   ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [CCF     ] Then Following Event is : 260  [P2Fs.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     -------------------------------------------------  
 150 CV9 fails to open                                                 
      [CV9.O       ]   [Open        ]   [dnOpen      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Open    ?]  or  [dnOpen  ?] 
     If [Open    ] Then Following Event is : 160  [SV10.O  ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [dnOpen  ] Then Following Event is : 260  [P2Fs.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     If [Open    ] Then it forces EVENT  300 on: ([V11V9CCF]-[No.CCF  ]) 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 160 SV10  fails to open                                               
      [SV10.O      ]   [Open        ]   [dnOpen      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Open    ?]  or  [dnOpen  ?] 
     If [Open    ] Then Following Event is : 170  [V45.C   ]-[Close   ]-[dnClose ] 
     If [dnOpen  ] Then Following Event is : 260  [P2Fs.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 170 V45 failure to close                                              
      [V45.C       ]   [Close       ]   [dnClose     ] 
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     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Close   ?]  or  [dnClose ?] 
     If [Close   ] Then Following Event is : 180  [V44.O   ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [dnClose ] Then Following Event is : 190  [V47.C   ]-[Close   ]-[dnClose ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 180 V44 failure to open                                               
      [V44.O       ]   [Open        ]   [dnOpen      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Open    ?]  or  [dnOpen  ?] 
     If [Open    ] Then Following Event is :  11  [PV.7.PF ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [dnOpen  ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 190 V47 failure to close                                              
      [V47.C       ]   [Close       ]   [dnClose     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Close   ?]  or  [dnClose ?] 
     If [Close   ] Then Following Event is : 180  [V44.O   ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [dnClose ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 260 P2 failure to start due to CCF                                    
      [P2Fs.CCF    ]   [No.CCF      ]   [CCF         ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [No.CCF  ?]  or  [CCF     ?] 
     If [No.CCF  ] Then Following Event is : 270  [P2Fst   ]-[Start   ]-[dnStart ] 
     If [CCF     ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
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     ------------------------------------------------- 
 270 P2 properly failure to start                                      
      [P2Fst       ]   [Start       ]   [dnStart     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Start   ?]  or  [dnStart ?] 
     If [Start   ] Then Following Event is : 280  [P2Fr.CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     If [dnStart ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     If [dnStart ] Then it forces EVENT  310 on: ([CV11.O  ]-[dnOpen  ]) 
     If [dnStart ] Then it forces EVENT  320 on: ([SV12.O  ]-[dnOpen  ]) 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 280 P2 failure to run due to CCF                                      
      [P2Fr.CCF    ]   [No.CCF      ]   [CCF         ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [No.CCF  ?]  or  [CCF     ?] 
     If [No.CCF  ] Then Following Event is : 290  [P2Frun  ]-[Run     ]-[dnRun   ] 
     If [CCF     ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 290 P2  failure to run                                                
      [P2Frun      ]   [Run         ]   [dnRun       ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Run     ?]  or  [dnRun   ?] 
     If [Run     ] Then Following Event is : 300  [V11V9CCF]-[No.CCF  ]-[CCF     ] 
     If [dnRun   ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
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 300 CCF to open of both V9V11                                         
      [V11V9CCF    ]   [No.CCF      ]   [CCF         ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [No.CCF  ?]  or  [CCF     ?] 
     If [No.CCF  ] Then Following Event is : 310  [CV11.O  ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [CCF     ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 310 V11 failure to open                                               
      [CV11.O      ]   [Open        ]   [dnOpen      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Open    ?]  or  [dnOpen  ?] 
     If [Open    ] Then Following Event is : 320  [SV12.O  ]-[Open    ]-[dnOpen  ] 
     If [dnOpen  ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 320 V12 failure to open                                               
      [SV12.O      ]   [Open        ]   [dnOpen      ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Question     :  [Open    ?]  or  [dnOpen  ?] 
     If [Open    ] Then Following Event is : 170  [V45.C   ]-[Close   ]-[dnClose ] 
     If [dnOpen  ] Then Following Event is : 901  [EWS     ]-[        ]-[Failure ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 901 EWS  Failure                                                      
      [EWS         ]   [            ]   [Failure     ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
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     Statement    :  [Failure !] 
     If [        ] Then  End                    
     If [Failure ] Then  End                    
     ------------------------------------------------- 
 100 EWS  Success                                                      
      [EWS         ]   [Success     ]   [            ] 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
     Statement    :  [Success !] 
     If [Success ] Then  End                    
     If [        ] Then  End                    
     ------------------------------------------------- 
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ANNEX C 
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ANNEX D 
 
EXAMPLE OF FORTRAN SUBROUTINE  PIECEWISE POLYNOM FIT.FOR 
$STORAGE:2 
$FLOATCALLS 
 
     
      SUBROUTINE DOWNCC 
    
      INTEGER      I  
      REAL         Q1,Q2,L0,L,T,DT 
      CHARACTER*14 TFIL1 
      LOGICAL      FL1,FQ1,FQ2 
    
      COMMON/FLG/FL1,FQ1 
      COMMON/CHR/TFIL1 
       
      Q1 = 30. 
      Q2 = 7. 
      L0 = 16. 
      FQ2  = .TRUE. 
       
     
    CALL CONCAT(TFIL1,'.GRF') 
   OPEN(1,FILE=TFIL1,STATUS='NEW') 
       
       I = 0 
       T = 0. 
       DT = 1. 
       L  = L0    
        
10     CONTINUE 
       
        WRITE(1,11000)  T,L 
        
       IF (T.GE.751.)  GOTO 100 
        
       IF (T.LT.309.) THEN 
      L = L0 
      END IF 
            
      IF (T.GE.310..AND.T.LE.420.) THEN  
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      L = -0.0996*T + 43.39 
      ENDIF 
           
      IF (T.GT.420..AND.T.LE.1500.) THEN  
      L = 0.006*T - 1.8525 
      ENDIF 
        
      IF (.NOT.FQ1.AND.T.EQ.150) THEN               
      L = L0 
      ENDIF 
        
     IF (.NOT.FQ1.AND.T.GT.150..AND.T.LE.751.) THEN                     
     L = - 3.09*T + 16 
     END IF 
 
     I = I+1 
    T = I*DT 
    GOTO 10       
        
 100   CONTINUE 
       CLOSE (1) 
       IF (L.LT.1.)          THEN 
           WRITE(0,10100) 
       ELSEIF (L.GT.1.)      THEN 
           WRITE(0,10101) 
        
      ENDIF 
        
11000 FORMAT(2(5X,1PE13.6)) 
10100 FORMAT(//,5X,'EWS FAILURE !!!',//) 
10101 FORMAT(//,5X,'EWS SUCCES !!!',//) 
 
 
      END 
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ANNEX E 
 
1   1.  0.  2   2   3  'SBO'   'Dn-Occur'  'Occurs' 
2   0.  0.  4   4   3  'SCRAM'  'Success'  'Failure' 
4  5.E-2   0.  6   90  3  'OpA-MSSV'  'Success' 'Failure' 
90  5.E-4  0.  6   900    3  'MSSV-Cyc'  'Success'  'Failure' 
6  0.  0.  10  10  3  '3.45bar' 'Success'  '  ' 
10  1.26E-4  0.  100   20   3  'EWS-ST'  'Success'  'Failure' 
20  5.E-4  0.  22  30   3  'Gridrec1'  'YES'  'NO' 
22  5.E-3   0.  100  50  3  'AFW-pump'  'Success'  'Failure' 
12  30  0.  0. 
12  40  0.  0. 
30  1.E-3  0.  22  40   3  'Gridrec2'  'YES'  'NO' 
40  5.E-3  0.  22  50   3  'Gridrec3'  'YES'  'NO' 
50  5.E-3  0.  60  900   3   'MobileDG'  'Success'  'Failure' 
60  5.E-3  0.  100  900  3  'EWS-pump'  'Success'  'Failure' 
900  1.  0.  0  0  3  'R FUSION'  ' '  'OCCURS' 
100  0.  0.  0  0  3  'NPPSTATE'  'SUCCESS'  '  ' 
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ANNEX F 
 
      CONST. sborec.PUN      of PARTITION  sborec.OUT     
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :      1 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Success    +       9.4988E-01        1.2600E-04 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    9.4988E-01 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  9.4988E-01 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :      2 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  YES        +       1.1964E-04        5.0000E-04 
     22  AFW-pump  Success    +       1.1904E-04        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    1.1904E-04 
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             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.1904E-04 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :      3 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  YES        +       1.1964E-04        5.0000E-04 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       5.9820E-07        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       5.9521E-07        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Success    +       5.9223E-07        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    5.9223E-07 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  5.9223E-07 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :      4 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  YES        +       1.1964E-04        5.0000E-04 
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     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       5.9820E-07        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       5.9521E-07        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Failure    -       2.9760E-09        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    2.9760E-09 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  2.9760E-09 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :      5 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  YES        +       1.1964E-04        5.0000E-04 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       5.9820E-07        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Failure    -       2.9910E-09        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    2.9910E-09 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  2.9910E-09 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :      6 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
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      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       5.9850E-08        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  YES        +       5.9790E-08        1.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Success    +       5.9491E-08        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    5.9491E-08 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  5.9491E-08 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :      7 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       5.9850E-08        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  YES        +       5.9790E-08        1.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       2.9895E-10        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       2.9746E-10        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Success    +       2.9597E-10        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    2.9597E-10 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  2.9597E-10 
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    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :      8 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       5.9850E-08        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  YES        +       5.9790E-08        1.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       2.9895E-10        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       2.9746E-10        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Failure    -       1.4873E-12        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    1.4873E-12 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.4873E-12 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :      9 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       5.9850E-08        5.0000E-04 
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     30  Gridrec2  YES        +       5.9790E-08        1.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       2.9895E-10        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Failure    -       1.4948E-12        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    1.4948E-12 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.4948E-12 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     10 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       5.9850E-08        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       5.9850E-11        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  YES        +       5.9551E-11        5.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Success    +       5.9253E-11        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    5.9253E-11 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  5.9253E-11 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     11 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
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      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       5.9850E-08        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       5.9850E-11        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  YES        +       5.9551E-11        5.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       2.9775E-13        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       2.9627E-13        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Success    +       2.9478E-13        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    2.9478E-13 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  2.9478E-13 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     12 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       5.9850E-08        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       5.9850E-11        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  YES        +       5.9551E-11        5.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       2.9775E-13        5.0000E-03 
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     50  MobileDG  Success    +       2.9627E-13        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Failure    -       1.4813E-15        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    1.4813E-15 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.4813E-15 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     13 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       5.9850E-08        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       5.9850E-11        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  YES        +       5.9551E-11        5.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       2.9775E-13        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Failure    -       1.4888E-15        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    1.4888E-15 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.4888E-15 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     14 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
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      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       5.9850E-08        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       5.9850E-11        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  NO         -       2.9925E-13        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       2.9775E-13        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Success    +       2.9626E-13        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    2.9626E-13 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  2.9626E-13 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     15 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       5.9850E-08        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       5.9850E-11        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  NO         -       2.9925E-13        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       2.9775E-13        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Failure    -       1.4888E-15        5.0000E-03 
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    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    1.4888E-15 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.4888E-15 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     16 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Success    +       9.5000E-01        5.0000E-02 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    9.5000E-01 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       1.1970E-04        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       5.9850E-08        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       5.9850E-11        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  NO         -       2.9925E-13        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Failure    -       1.4963E-15        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    1.4963E-15 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.4963E-15 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     17 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
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      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Success    +       4.9969E-02        1.2600E-04 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    4.9969E-02 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  4.9969E-02 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     18 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  YES        +       6.2937E-06        5.0000E-04 
     22  AFW-pump  Success    +       6.2622E-06        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    6.2622E-06 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  6.2622E-06 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     19 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
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     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  YES        +       6.2937E-06        5.0000E-04 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       3.1469E-08        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       3.1311E-08        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Success    +       3.1155E-08        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    3.1155E-08 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  3.1155E-08 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     20 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  YES        +       6.2937E-06        5.0000E-04 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       3.1469E-08        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       3.1311E-08        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Failure    -       1.5656E-10        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    1.5656E-10 
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             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.5656E-10 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     21 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  YES        +       6.2937E-06        5.0000E-04 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       3.1469E-08        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Failure    -       1.5734E-10        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    1.5734E-10 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.5734E-10 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     22 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
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     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       3.1484E-09        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  YES        +       3.1453E-09        1.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Success    +       3.1296E-09        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    3.1296E-09 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  3.1296E-09 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     23 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       3.1484E-09        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  YES        +       3.1453E-09        1.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       1.5726E-11        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       1.5648E-11        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Success    +       1.5570E-11        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    1.5570E-11 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.5570E-11 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     24 
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      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       3.1484E-09        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  YES        +       3.1453E-09        1.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       1.5726E-11        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       1.5648E-11        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Failure    -       7.8239E-14        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    7.8239E-14 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  7.8239E-14 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     25 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       3.1484E-09        5.0000E-04 
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     30  Gridrec2  YES        +       3.1453E-09        1.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       1.5726E-11        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Failure    -       7.8632E-14        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    7.8632E-14 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  7.8632E-14 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     26 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       3.1484E-09        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       3.1484E-12        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  YES        +       3.1327E-12        5.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Success    +       3.1170E-12        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    3.1170E-12 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  3.1170E-12 
  
  
    ---------------------------- 
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    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     27 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       3.1484E-09        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       3.1484E-12        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  YES        +       3.1327E-12        5.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       1.5663E-14        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       1.5585E-14        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Success    +       1.5507E-14        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    1.5507E-14 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.5507E-14 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     28 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
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     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       3.1484E-09        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       3.1484E-12        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  YES        +       3.1327E-12        5.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       1.5663E-14        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       1.5585E-14        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Failure    -       7.7925E-17        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    7.7925E-17 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  7.7925E-17 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     29 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       3.1484E-09        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       3.1484E-12        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  YES        +       3.1327E-12        5.0000E-03 
     22  AFW-pump  Failure    -       1.5663E-14        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Failure    -       7.8317E-17        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    7.8317E-17 
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             PROBABILITY equal to  :  7.8317E-17 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     30 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       3.1484E-09        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       3.1484E-12        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  NO         -       1.5742E-14        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       1.5663E-14        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Success    +       1.5585E-14        5.0000E-03 
    100  NPPSTATE  SUCCESS    +  V    1.5585E-14 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  1.5585E-14 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     31 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
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     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       3.1484E-09        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       3.1484E-12        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  NO         -       1.5742E-14        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Success    +       1.5663E-14        5.0000E-03 
     60  EWS-pump  Failure    -       7.8317E-17        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    7.8317E-17 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  7.8317E-17 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     32 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Success    +       4.9975E-02        5.0000E-04 
      6  3.45bar   Success    +  V    4.9975E-02 
     10  EWS-ST    Failure    -       6.2969E-06        1.2600E-04 
     20  Gridrec1  NO         -       3.1484E-09        5.0000E-04 
     30  Gridrec2  NO         -       3.1484E-12        1.0000E-03 
     40  Gridrec3  NO         -       1.5742E-14        5.0000E-03 
     50  MobileDG  Failure    -       7.8711E-17        5.0000E-03 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    7.8711E-17 
141 
 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  7.8711E-17 
    ---------------------------- 
    CONSTITUENT Ordinal :     33 
  
      1  SBO       Occurs     -  V    1.0000E+00 
      2  SCRAM     Success    +  V    1.0000E+00 
      4  OpA-MSSV  Failure    -       5.0000E-02        5.0000E-02 
     90  MSSV-Cyc  Failure    -       2.5000E-05        5.0000E-04 
    900  R FUSION  OCCURS     -  V    2.5000E-05 
  
             PROBABILITY equal to  :  2.5000E-05 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
